# MSDI NATO Good-Bad



## NATO Good

### Laundry List

#### A strong NATO solves a laundry list of conflicts and impacts

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22, (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3-21-2022, Government of the Netherlands, What does NATO do? Foreign Affairs in plain language, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2022/03/21/what-does-nato-do-netherlands-safety, 6-25-2022) SCade

Safety and security in the Netherlands A safer world also means a safer Netherlands. Why? Take for instance terrorism, nuclear weapons or cyberattacks. These threats have one thing in common: they don’t stop at borders. So our own safety and security often starts abroad. That’s why it’s important to have good relations with other countries. And to protect stability in the world together. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works hard to do this. NATO also plays an important role. But what exactly is NATO? What is NATO? NATO stands for ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organization’. It is a military alliance of 30 countries in Europe and North America. Its headquarters is in Brussels. The Netherlands is a member of NATO. NATO was set up in 1949, not long after the end of the Second World War. Its aim: to protect the security and freedom of all the countries that are members (the Allies). And right now, that Alliance is perhaps more important than ever. Worldwide security challenges The world is a less safe place than before. Even in areas near the Netherlands. Take for instance the war in Ukraine started by President Putin. Or China: a growing global economic and military power that is flexing its muscles more and more often. Technological developments also lead to new threats, like cyberattacks. Or the use of modern weapons, like drones, that can attack targets without humans having to risk their lives. And climate change can also lead to more conflicts, or make conflicts worse. Countries need each other so they can prevent and combat these global threats. NATO and diplomacy NATO is a defensive military alliance. You might think NATO is all about military action. But there is another very important step that comes first. NATO’s main priority is diplomacy. By talking to each other and with other countries, we try to solve conflicts without using force. Within NATO, the Allies work together and make agreements. For instance on protecting democratic values. Examples are: being able to hold free and fair elections, equal rights for everyone, and freedom of expression. Within NATO, military and non-military experts meet to exchange information about what is happening in the world. In this way, NATO prepares itself for the challenges and threats of today and of the future. With military and diplomatic action. NATO in the world NATO also helps other countries – that aren’t members of NATO – with their security. For instance by helping them train their soldiers. NATO soldiers can also be sent to deal with a crisis. This is important for the Netherlands too. Because the world is becoming more and more closely connected. And our safety and security is also connected to that of other countries. Article 5: what happens if a NATO country is attacked? An attack one of NATO’s member countries is an attack on all of them. Article 5 is the most important part of the North Atlantic Treaty, the treaty on which NATO is based. If one NATO member country is attacked, all members will provide it with military support. This way, the country that has been attacked doesn't stand alone. The attack doesn't have to be with tanks and guns; it could also be a cyberattack, for instance. So basically, NATO make us safer together. But how does a country become a member of NATO? When can a country join NATO? A country can’t just simply join NATO. There are certain requirements and steps that the country has to take. Step 1: the country must meet NATO’s three basic requirements. Only European countries and countries in North America can join NATO. That was decided when NATO was first set up. The country must be democratic. And the country must contribute to security in the European-Atlantic region. Step 2: the country must take part in the Membership Action Plan. This means the country is assessed and given help with meeting NATO’s other requirements. Those requirements have to do with freedom, human rights, democracy and the legal system. Sometimes it means that reforms are needed in the country that wants to be a member. Step 3: the country must agree to NATO’s aims, rights and obligations. The country makes these agreements in talks with NATO members. Step 4: all NATO member countries must agree to the country’s membership. All NATO members sign a document called the accession protocol. Step 5: the country’s own people must agree to NATO membership. This can be decided by parliament, or by holding a referendum. Every country is different. So some countries may take longer to become a member than others. NATO and the Netherlands To protect our way of life, the Netherlands works to build a strong Europe and a strong NATO. By working together with other countries and making agreements with them, we stand stronger in the world.

#### NATO cohesion solves a litany of impacts while ensuring increased EU capabilities

Ben Hodges, 18, (Ben Hodges, 12-7-2018, GMFUS, Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO, https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato, 6-26-2022) SCade

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The U.S. Priority: China A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific. The U.S. Commitment to Europe Many European leaders have expressed uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to Europe, based on President Barack Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” and, more recently, President Donald Trump’s questioning of the relevance and value of NATO and the EU. The facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that the United States, including the current administration, is fully committed to its long-time allies and partners in Europe. Everything promised by the Obama administration at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw is being delivered by the Trump administration: a rotational armored brigade combat team, pre-positioned equipment for an army armored division, and the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland. The administration just announced an additional 1,500 soldiers in an artillery brigade and short-range air defense battalion that will be assigned to Europe. The operational contingency fund, known as the European Reassurance Initiative, which started during the Obama administration, has increased steadily over the last three years and is now known as the European Deterrence Initiative, reflecting U.S. backing for Europe and deterrence of Russia. Also telling was the Senate vote just prior to this year’s NATO’s summit in Brussels, which affirmed by a 98:2 margin U.S. support for Article 5. The United States’ commitment to European partners like Ukraine and Georgia also remains very strong, as evidenced by provision of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system, other equipment, and training, as well as continued support for these countries’ eventual membership in NATO and the return of their territories from Russia. U.S. Perspectives on European Military Capabilities and Strategic Autonomy Europe is responding to these U.S. initiatives with increased investments, adaptation of NATO’s command structures, increased training and readiness, and renewed efforts within European frameworks to improve security and defense capabilities. The United States will continue to welcome any increases in the capability of its European allies and partners to contribute to collective security and defense, and to take on more responsibility for the burdens of global security and stability. The creation of the Permanent Structure for Cooperation framework is particularly encouraging in that it is legally binding and is already showing promise, with key projects such as the one on military mobility. Efforts to create a larger EU military structure, however, might be met with less enthusiasm. Parallel to NATO, such a structure would create redundant and unnecessary capabilities, and draw away the officers needed to fill existing European commitments to the alliance. Some European leaders have called for European security autonomy. However, the notion of autonomy is confusing and poorly understood, even in Europe, let alone in the United States Even the latter does not have unlimited autonomy: it seeks allies and builds coalitions for everything it does. Furthermore, the United States does not have the capacity nor the desire to carry out missions alone, as, for example, in Afghanistan, Libya, or Syria. However, if a more independent European security policy was to move forward in a spirit of transparency while consciously avoiding redundancy, the United States would likely be supportive. Having European troops on counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and peacekeeping missions in Africa is a welcome form of burden sharing. Undoubtedly, the United States depends on European countries to lead in solving European problems, and to take on a greater share of collective security in Europe; for example, with air and missile defense, intelligence, and logistics. European help in the Middle East and even in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific further contributes to burden sharing. What Needs to Be Done Several things still remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States are to get to the point where they need to be. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains as well. Inconsistencies in the behavior of some European countries that pursue political and economic policies that are counter to transatlantic security efforts are unhelpful, particularly with respect to the deterrence of Russia and countering the growing threat from China. As Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell recently stated, “We expect those whom America helps to not abet our rivals. Western Europeans cannot continue to deepen energy dependence on the same Russia that America defends it against. Or enrich themselves on the same Iran that is building ballistic missiles which threaten Europe.”1 The United States supports the the Three Seas Initiative as a way to build energy independence for Central and Eastern Europe as well as improving infrastructure connection between Northern and Southern Europe – all of which will enhance Europe’s stability, security, and prosperity. Additional investment by the United States and Western European countries into Central and Eastern Europe would be an effective way to counter attempts by Russia and by China to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, and between European countries. Second, continued inequity in burden sharing hinders a stronger relationship between the United States and Europe, and it erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Addressing the realities and the perceptions of this inequity is important to address a sense of unfairness and unmet expectations in the United States. The 2 percent defense spending pledge of all NATO members at the Wales Summit in 2014, notably including using 20 percent of their spending to invest in major new equipment and related research and development, is an important step forward as well as a strategic message to Russia that the alliance is prepared to address the changed security environment. These investments are the necessary underpinning for all that must be done for deterrence, defense, and projecting stability. To paraphrase NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, it was acceptable to reduce defense investment when tensions were low but it is also important and necessary to be willing to increase them when tensions rise. The need for European countries to increase defense spending is nothing new. Every president since Dwight Eisenhower has challenged the United States’ European allies to do more. Even President Obama called some European countries “free riders”. Thanks to the efforts of Stoltenberg and many national leaders, including President Trump, the alliance has made meaningful progress with most members at or on a path to achieve the 2 percent obligation by 2024. Nearly every one of them has increased their defense spending or at least halted falls in it. In reaching the necessary spending threshold, a more sophisticated definition of burden sharing and the 2 percent goal is required. Investments must be oriented towards collective security, and to do so the focus must shift from inputs to outcomes. Stoltenberg has referred to the “Three Cs”: cash, capabilities, and contributions. The transatlantic allies must invest today what is required to develop capabilities tomorrow to make operational contributions the day after tomorrow. Many of these required capabilities are not purely military, nor are they financed by the budgets of the various Ministries of Defense. Transportation infrastructure is well below what is needed for fully effective deterrence or, if deterrence fails, operational requirements. Cyber protection is necessary for all the airports and seaports the alliance needs for rapid reinforcement and sustainment. Fuel pipelines that reach into potential operational fields are necessary. Protected fiber communications networks need to be in place ahead of a crisis for moving rapidly forces from across the alliance. NATO member states need to improve or build highways, bridges, and tunnels that can accommodate larger vehicles. This is particularly the case in Central and Eastern Europe because modern military vehicles, such as German Leopard tanks or U.S. Abrams tanks, are much heavier and larger than those that were typically used in former Warsaw Pact countries. These are not military-specific capabilities but they are essential for everything NATO does or will need to do. National defense investment could be incentivized by counting spending on these essential capabilities if they have demonstrable, dual-use military value. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. A new sort of Iron Curtain has developed with Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey on one side and Russia on the other, along with NATO’s partners Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Russia has almost 10,000 soldiers occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. It has over 25,000 soldiers in the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula and thousands of soldiers aiding separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk in eastern Ukraine. In the Sea of Azov, Russia has built a bridge across the Kerch strait, connecting its mainland to Crimea. This effectively blockades Ukrainian ports because the bridge is too low to allow the passage of many commercial vessels that would normally carry Ukrainian steel from Mariupol to different markets. This was intentionally done to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and stop its efforts to join the West. It can also lead to a dangerous military escalation, as illustrated by the recent seizing of Ukrainian naval vessels by Russia. All of these activities are part of Russia’s overall effort to extend its control and influence in the Black Sea region, which is vital to its operations in Syria, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Europe needs to maintain its sanctions until Russia lives up to the Minsk Agreement and returns Ukraine’s occupied territories. It should also continue to support eventual membership in the EU and NATO by Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia should be invited to join NATO immediately. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. Deterrence requires having the real capability to compel a potential adversary. This is not simply a matter of equipment or formations, but rather recognizing Russia’s new approach to conflict, which seeks to blur the distinction between peacetime and wartime, to use cyber and misinformation to prevent political and military leaders from realizing what is happening, and then to intimidate and coerce using the threats or even force necessary to achieve its objectives. Underpinning this capability are three different “speeds”. First, speed of recognition. This means using all means necessary to identify rapidly a situation before it becomes a true crisis. This requires that the EU and NATO improve intelligence sharing and communications, networks that will certainly be under stress and likely targeted by cyber-attacks. Second, speed of decision. Political leaders will need to make decisions quickly in order to allow military commanders to start the movement of equipment, units, and materiel when necessary. At the same time, they will want to avoid doing anything that looks provocative or escalatory. This means, for example, that planners cannot assume that governments will automatically waive normal EU road restrictions, prioritize military convoys over civilian commercial traffic on highways, or give priority to military equipment on rail over previously scheduled commercial shipments. Thus, most if not all initial reactions will happen in peacetime conditions. Third, speed of assembly. This is key in order to give political leaders options other than a liberation campaign. The transatlantic allies must be able to move quickly to demonstrate to Russia that NATO is prepared, determined, and positioned to protect its members and key interests. This is why military mobility, essential for effective deterrence, is already identified and supported as a priority by NATO and the EU. This is the perfect nexus for their cooperation, one that was emphasized at the NATO summits in Warsaw and Brussels. As they transition from expeditionary operations to a deterrence posture, European members and partners of the transatlantic alliance must regain a culture of readiness where equipment, formations, and headquarters are all able to perform their assigned missions. Having units that are not fully manned or trained, or expensive vehicles or aircraft or ships that are not properly maintained are clear signals that the alliance is not prepared to defend its members – and thus increases the risk of miscalculation by Russia. Conclusion The United States is committed to the stability and security of Europe, as it has been for over 100 years ever since the first U.S. soldiers arrived in France during World War I. This has been demonstrated regardless of who has been in the White House and which party-controlled Congress. The American people have a special affinity for Europe, and the economic prosperity of the United States depends on the continent’s security and stability. But they also expect that their European friends and allies will pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order around the globe and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

inspire

### China Mod

#### NATO key to countering China in SCS and ECS

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On the eve of the NATO Summit in London last December, the Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the need for a collective response to China’s emergence as a global power. “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” he stated, “but it’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.” At the summit, NATO heads of state diplomatically declared that China has become a concern: “we recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”

Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, for NATO to avoid China. Beijing presents a full spectrum challenge to the transatlantic community—a challenge whose potential mirrors, if not surpasses, that once posed by the former Soviet Union. China’s $14 trillion economy is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, and Beijing exercises that might in a predatory fashion around the globe, including in the United States and Europe. China threatens to boycott companies and countries that criticize its policies, leverages its debt instruments against poor nations, and is buying up critical infrastructure around the world. Its acquisition of European ports has raised concerns of top NATO commanders who warn that such ownership could adversely affect the Alliance’s ability to use those facilities in times of crisis.

China is a technological challenge to the West. It is a leader in 5G communications, artificial intelligence, hyper-sonic weapons, and quantum computing. It has demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to exercise that prowess against Western interests and security. Chinese cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns have become part of daily life for all NATO allies, including both their governments and private enterprises.

Beijing’s military is a major driver behind China’s technological edge and is developing and exercising global reach. China’s $260 billion defense budget has a purchasing power estimated to equal or exceed 70 percent of that of the US defense budget. China’s military cooperation with Russia continues to expand and the two exercise not only in the plains of Central Asia but in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Chinese military forces are the pointy of end of the spear Beijing uses to undermine the rules based international order. Its maritime claims and aggressive activities in South and East China Seas stand among its more prominent actions.

And, China’s leadership relishes its role as an ideological challenge to the West and the latter’s practice of liberal democracy. China usesits economic, technological, and military power to promote globally its form of national authoritarianism. Beijing even asserts that its political model has provided the most adept and agile response to today’s coronavirus epidemic.

So how should NATO should respond to China’s growing global assertiveness? What should be NATO’s China strategy?

When considering this issue, it is important to recognize that the foundation for a relevant NATO role in a transatlantic China strategy has long been established. For decades, the Alliance has been operating around the world. NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2003. Its naval forces have patrolled against pirates off the shores of Africa, commencing with operation OCEAN SHIELD in 2008. As a member of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO provides training to military establishments across the Middle East. And, on a daily basis the Alliance addresses terrorism, cyber-threats, disinformation, and other global issues.

Most relevant to addressing China are the Alliance’s long-standing relationships with key democracies of the Indo-Pacific region. NATO established Global Partnerships with Korea, New Zealand, and Mongolia in 2012, Australia in 2013, and Japan in 2014. These relationships are predominantly consultative, but most of these partners have contributed to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan.

As the transatlantic community’s lead instrument for security collaboration, NATO can contribute to the former’s relationship with China in three important ways. As a multinational security forum, it can foster among NATO allies and partners a shared awareness of China’s capacities and activities that generate risk to and opportunity for the North Atlantic community. NATO has long served as an important forum through which its Allies and partners share intelligence data and assessments needed to foster and facilitate collaborative action.

Second, NATO can help develop and promulgate a transatlantic security strategy and posture regarding China. That strategy’s objectives should include the development of a cooperative relationship with China as well the dissuasion of China from undermining the interests of the transatlantic community. The latter would define the appropriate role and means for the Alliance to contribute to deterrence and when necessary defense against Chinese aggression that imperil those interests.

Third, NATO’s civilian and military capacities should be used to facilitate the defense and security component of a Western strategy addressing China—including in the tasks of engagement, deterrence, and defense.

#### SCS war escalates to extinction.

Klare 17 – Michael Klare, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, “Escalation Watch: Four Global Hotspots for Trump”, Asia Times, 1-20, http://www.atimes.com/article/escalation-watch-four-global-hotspots-trump/

Within months of taking office, President Donald Trump is likely to face one or more major international crises, possibly entailing a risk of nuclear escalation. Not since the end of the Cold War has a new chief executive been confronted with as many potential flashpoints involving such a potential for explosive conflict.

This proliferation of crises has been brewing for some time, but the situation appears especially ominous now given Trump’s pledge to bring American military force swiftly to bear on any threats of foreign transgression. With so much at risk, it’s none too soon to go on a permanent escalation watch, monitoring the major global hotspots for any sign of imminent flare-ups, hoping that early warnings (and the outcry that goes with them) might help avert catastrophe.

Looking at the world today, four areas appear to pose an especially high risk of sudden crisis and conflict: North Korea, the South China Sea, the Baltic Sea region, and the Middle East. Each of them has been the past site of recurring clashes, and all are primed to explode early in the Trump presidency.

Why are we seeing so many potential crises now? Is this period really different from earlier presidential transitions?

It’s true that the changeover from one presidential administration to another can be a time of global uncertainty, given America’s pivotal importance in world affairs and the natural inclination of rival powers to test the mettle of the country’s new leader. There are, however, other factors that make this moment particularly worrisome, including the changing nature of the world order, the personalities of its key leaders, and an ominous shift in military doctrine.

Trump may lift gold as new leaders carry risk

Just as the United States is going through a major political transition, so is the planet at large. The sole-superpower system of the post-Cold War era is finally giving way to a multipolar, if not increasingly fragmented, world in which the United States must share the limelight with other major actors, including China, Russia, India, and Iran. Political scientists remind us that transitional periods can often prove disruptive, as “status quo” powers (in this case, the United States) resist challenges to their dominance from “revisionist” states seeking to alter the global power equation. Typically, this can entail proxy wars and other kinds of sparring over contested areas, as has recently been the case in Syria, the Baltic, and the South China Sea.

This is where the personalities of key leaders enter the equation. Though President Obama oversaw constant warfare, he was temperamentally disinclined to respond with force to every overseas crisis and provocation, fearing involvement in yet more foreign wars like Iraq and Afghanistan. His critics, including Donald Trump, complained bitterly that this stance only encouraged foreign adversaries to up their game, convinced that the US had lost its will to resist provocation. In a Trump administration, as The Donald indicated on the campaign trail last year, America’s adversaries should expect far tougher responses. Asked in September, for instance, about an incident in the Persian Gulf in which Iranian gunboats approached American warships in a threatening manner, he typically told reporters, “When they circle our beautiful destroyers with their little boats and make gestures that … they shouldn’t be allowed to make, they will be shot out of the water.”

Although with Russia, unlike Iran, Trump has promised to improve relations, there’s no escaping the fact that Vladimir Putin’s urge to restore some of his country’s long-lost superpower glory could lead to confrontations with Nato powers that would put the new American president in a distinctly awkward position. Regarding Asia, Trump has often spoken of his intent to punish China for what he considers its predatory trade practices, a stance guaranteed to clash with President Xi Jinping’s goal of restoring his country’s greatness. This should, in turn, generate additional possibilities for confrontation, especially in the contested South China Sea. Both Putin and Xi, moreover, are facing economic difficulties at home and view foreign adventurism as a way of distracting public attention from disappointing domestic performances.

### China Mod – Extension

#### Weakening NATO means Asian allies bandwagon to China – takes SCS/Taiwan

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The fourth consequences of life without NATO would be global. American bilateral alliances in Asia would each be shaken to their core should NATO fail. America’s defense commitments there would become worthless. With China determined to claim a dominant position in Asia, the collapse of NATO would cause America’s Asian partners to seek accommodation with China, much as the Philippines is in the process of doing.

Trump’s decision to abandon the economic Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement has already given China new advantages in the region. Without credible American security commitments, there would be little to stop China from controlling the South China Sea and probably occupying Taiwan as well. Add to this equation the new footholds that China is building in central Asia, Africa and Europe: Abandoning NATO would help assure China’s competitive success.

The final impact of NATO’s retirement would be the near collapse of what has been called the “liberal international order.” This order consists of treaties, alliances, agreements, institutions and modes of behavior mostly created by the United States in an effort to safeguard democracies.

This order has kept relative peace in the trans-Atlantic space for seven decades. The Trump administration has begun to unravel elements of this order in the naive notion that they undercut American sovereignty. The entire European project is built on the edifice of this order. NATO is its principal keystone. Collapsing this edifice would undercut the multiple structures that have brought seven decades of peace and prosperity.

So the answer is clear. Life without NATO would be more dangerous and less prosperous. Russia and China would be the big winners at America’s expense. NATO simply can’t retire.

Yes, NATO has problems. It needs to be managed. But there is too much left to be done for retirement. And there is too much to lose if NATO fails.

#### War over the South China Seas goes nuclear:

Polina Tikhonova, 11/28/2015 (Master's Degree in English Philology from the University of Oxford, “US Faces Nuclear War Threat Over South China Sea – Chinese Professor,” http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-nuclear-war-south-china-sea/, Acccessed 2/7/2017, rwg)

U.S. could provoke nuclear war with China And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea, the disputed islands present China’s strategic interests, which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an advantage in “the balance of resolve” over Washington, according to the professor. And if the South China Sea situation escalates and starts spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the world’s largest military force with a strength of approximately 2.285 million personnel. “Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S.,” Baohui wrote. So it would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area, since China’s willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility could easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S. interests, according to the professor.

**NATO is taking steps toward combating Chinese aggression**

AL JAZEERA (al jazeera is an international news agency). “NATO declares China a security challenge for the first time” 30 June 2022 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/30/nato-names-china-a-strategic-priority-for-the-first-time>

“One of the things that [China’s] doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which China is yet to condemn, could embolden Beijing to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. Marcin Jerzewski, head of the Taiwan office of the European Values Center for Security Policy, told Al Jazeera that NATO members may also be concerned about Chinese-Russian military cooperation on Russia’s oft-forgotten Pacific coast. Before the war in Ukraine, Putin began pursuing his own “pivot to the east” by ramping up economic development and his military presence on the Pacific Coast. “This is an important step for NATO and in a way a sign that NATO is waking up to a new geopolitical reality, which is largely defined by the growing confluence of Russian and Chinese strategic interests,” Jerzewski said. “Russia has been viewed mainly as a source of threats in the European theatre, but that view ignores Russia’s physical presence on the shores of the Pacific.” Highlighting NATO’s new focus on China, the gathering of world leaders in Madrid, both inside the bloc’s summit and on its sidelines, included many from Asian nations. It was the first time that the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand were invited to a NATO summit. They participated in a NATO session on new global challenges after holding a side meeting outside of the summit.

### Europe Mod

#### NATO prevents intra-European wars

Katz 15 [Mark N. Katz, Professor of Govt & Politics at GMU, “Why Russia Shouldn't Fear NATO,” The National Interest, 2015, [www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-shouldnt-fear-nato-13243](http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-shouldnt-fear-nato-13243)]

The corollary of Moscow belief that the expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia is that the retraction, incapacitation, or dissolution of NATO would make Russia safer. Indeed, Putin’s support for anti-NATO and anti–EU political parties throughout Europe indicates that he does indeed aim at undermining these two institutions. Nor does Putin necessarily need to bring about their dissolution in order to undermine them. Since NATO and the EU both tend to operate on the basis of consensus, the fact that the current political leaders of Hungary and Greece are hostile to the existing European order and are quite friendly with Moscow may go a long way toward furthering Putin’s goal of rendering NATO inoperable. And if any more such leaders are elected to power, NATO might indeed become unable to respond effectively to actions taken by Putin to “protect” Russian speakers elsewhere in Ukraine or even in the Baltic states. This clearly would not benefit the West. But it would not benefit Russia either. For the decline of NATO is less likely to lead to the unopposed rise of Russian influence than to the re-emergence of conflicts that common membership in NATO has suppressed or (in the case of Greece and Turkey) kept under control. Putin has had relatively cooperative relations with the often anti-Western Erdogan government in Turkey. He also has good relations with Greece’s new leftist leadership that is at odds with the EU. But if (whether as a result of Putin’s actions or not) NATO becomes inoperable, the Greek-Turkish animosity that NATO helped keep from escalating after Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus might soon re-emerge. And if it does, it is highly doubtful that Russia will be able to calm it down. Moscow may then be faced with the choice of alienating one party because it sides with the other, or alienating both because it sides with neither or (as Putin has attempted elsewhere) tries to side with both simultaneously. Despite Turkey’s troubled relations with the West recently, Turkey may regard Russian support for Greece against it as an existential threat and thus go all out to support Chechen and other Muslim opponents of Moscow’s rule in the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia. The decline of NATO might also embolden an increasingly nationalist and pro-Russian Hungary to revive its claim to “lost territories.” Moscow might not mind if Budapest does this with pro-Western Ukraine or Romania (with which Russia also has difficult relations), but would not be pleased if Hungary sought the return of territory that is now part of pro-Russian Serbia or Slovakia (where Moscow has also sought to cultivate illiberal tendencies). Another problem for Moscow is that for every anti-Western government elected to office anywhere in Europe, one or more of its neighbors are likely to feel threatened by it and so turn to America for support. Further, while German public opinion may care little about what Russia is doing in faraway Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, Berlin is likely to take more active measures to thwart Moscow’s efforts to expand Russian influence in countries closer to it. Finally, the more that Western states see Russian actions as directly harming their security, the more incentive they will have to respond by arming Ukraine or others actively resisting Russia. In other words, the decline of the pax Americana in Europe resulting from a weakened NATO is less likely to be replaced by a pax Russica there, but by a chaotic situation in Europe that Russia will be unable to control or prevent from negatively impacting not just Russia’s external ambitions, but its internal security as well. Ironically, Russia could avoid all this if NATO remained strong and intact. Far from threatening Russia, a strong NATO has a much greater incentive to act with self-restraint toward Russia than individual countries (both members and non-members) being undermined by Russian actions. Indeed, offering NATO membership to what remains of Ukraine may be the surest means of inducing Kiev and the West as a whole to acquiesce to (though not formally accept) the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine to Russia. In other words, Moscow is better off with a strong NATO that keeps America in, Europe peaceful, and Russia by itself (if that’s what it wants) than a weak NATO (or no NATO at all) that keeps America, Europe, and Russia all embroiled in needless conflict and tension

#### Europe war escalates

Charles Glaser, Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the U of Chicago, Summer 1993 International Security

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of a major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a major European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggest it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

### Europe Mod – Extension

#### NATO collapse causes European countries to turn inward and re-invest into domestic arms

**Trofimov 19** - Columnist and Senior Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal [Yaroslav, Jan 4th, *Wall Street Journal,* “Is Europe Ready to Defend Itself?”, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-europe-ready-to-defend-itself-11546623417>]

The new Republican administration in Washington issued a blunt warning: Unless Europe quickly set up its own unified army, the U.S. would be compelled to undertake an “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment to defend its European allies.

The year was 1953, and the main target of American ire was France, whose delay in ratifying the European Defense Community treaty, signed the previous year, meant that preparations for a federal European army had to be paused. But the pressure applied by the Eisenhower administration backfired spectacularly: A joyous choir of French lawmakers broke into the “Marseillaise” when France’s parliament finally rejected the treaty in August 1954. The idea of a joint European defense policy was shelved for decades.

Today, the push for **European autonomy** in defense—and even for a common European Union army—**is gathering momentum again**, in part because of **doubts** in many European capitals about President Donald Trump’s **willingness to defend** the continent against a renewed threat from Russia. Mr. Trump’s abrupt decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, which prompted Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to resign, has added new urgency to the drive.

This time around, the revival of European defense integration is championed by French President Emmanuel **Macron and** German Chancellor Angela **Merkel**, while the American president keeps lobbing angry tweets at the very idea. And inside Europe, the skeptics today aren’t in Paris but in the former Soviet vassal-states in the east that, despite all their misgivings, still view the U.S. as the only credible guarantor of their survival as independent nations.

A historic swing in Europe’s public opinion, particularly in Germany—**the EU’s most powerful state** and one where trans-Atlantic cooperation was the bedrock of the political consensus since the end of World War II—has fueled this change.

Mr. Trump has described the EU as a “foe” and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as “obsolete,” and he has publicly questioned why American soldiers should die for a NATO ally like Montenegro. One recent opinion poll showed that Germans now rank Mr. Trump **as the greatest threat** to their country. In another, 73% of Germans described their relationship with the U.S. as “bad,” and 72% wanted a foreign policy **more independent** from Washington’s.

“The shift in public opinion is due to a mix of disappointment and fear,” said Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, a think tank that advises the German government and parliament. “There is a fear that the U.S. will be **less interested** in Europe, and that the security commitments of the U.S. will **no longer be reliable**.”

It was in this political environment that Ms. Merkel told the European Parliament in a landmark speech in November: “The times when we could fully rely on others have ended.…If we Europeans want to survive as a community, we must make a greater effort to take our destiny into our own hands.”

Achieving such “strategic autonomy” became the EU’s official policy in 2016. Though calls by Mr. Macron and Ms. Merkel for a European army **are largely rhetorical** so far, several **concrete initiatives** to achieve that goal have been launched since then. Probably most significant is the $15 billion European Defense Fund, which aims to spur Europe’s military industry and could limit the influence of American weapons manufacturers. Another new initiative is the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation system, under which European armies seek to remove the barriers to joint action that stem from fielding so many different—and often incompatible—types of weapons. Addressing a frequently voiced demand of Mr. Trump, European governments have also raised their defense spending to get closer to the NATO target of 2% of each country’s GDP.

On the face of it, there is no reason why an economic giant like the EU shouldn’t be able to protect itself against Russia even without American help. Setting aside Britain (which seeks to continue to cooperate with the EU on security and defense even after leaving the bloc), the remaining EU’s population and defense budgets are roughly three times Russia’s size. France, the EU’s military powerhouse, spends almost as much as Russia on defense just by itself and operates an independent nuclear arsenal. All those sums, of course, are dwarfed by the U.S., whose military budget is nearly double the defense spending of the EU (minus the departing U.K.) and Russia combined.

“Europe is addicted to the American security umbrella,” said Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, a think tank that advises the French government. “But if the U.S. weren’t there, Europe would have found a way to defend itself.”

Yet there is a Catch-22 that makes these aspirations risky. Building up European defenses **after seven decades** of American protection **would take time**. Meanwhile, every move that Europe attempts in this direction spurs an American backlash, further undermining NATO’s cohesion—and its deterrent capacity against a rapidly militarizing Russia.

“We have to hedge. But it is a very tricky situation: When does the hedge become a wedge?” said François Heisbourg, a veteran French expert who advised Mr. Macron’s presidential campaign on security and defense.

“Trump doesn’t believe in alliances and doesn’t understand what an alliance is,” he added. “So if we discover that Plan A—what has happened over the last 70 years—**is no longer on offer**, **we would have been remiss** if we had not worked on Plan B. But of course, we do not want to precipitate the end of Plan A by getting Plan B wrong. This is the challenge for every country that is allied with the U.S.”

It is a particularly urgent challenge for NATO countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Officials there fret about loose talk of a European army and dislike the very concept of EU “strategic autonomy,” fearing that it may needlessly alienate the U.S. After all, if you border on Russia, what you want is more Americans in your neighborhood now, not a pretext for cost-conscious Washington to pull the plug. “Autonomy means autonomy from someone—it’s better to use another term, such as a European push forward or European structural strengthening,” said Lithuania’s defense minister, Raimundas Karoblis.

Poland, another neighbor of Russia, has even offered to pay more than $2 billion to set up a permanent U.S. base on its soil, proposing to call it Fort Trump in a not-so-subtle appeal to the president’s vanity. (Washington is still evaluating the proposal, while German officials are lobbying against it, fearing that it would further antagonize Russia.)

“We believe that the United States is indispensable in European security,” said Bartosz Cichocki, Poland’s deputy foreign minister for security affairs. He held up the November 2018 incident in the Black Sea, where Russia attacked and seized three Ukrainian navy ships, as a sobering example of just how hollow the EU’s role in defending the region’s security remains. “Where was Europe? Nowhere. Those who advocate a European army, European self-sufficiency, had a great opportunity to take the lead, to show us the way of how to de-escalate and how to stop Russia,” he scoffed.

Such divisions within Europe on security matters make it a much **weaker adversary for Russia**, which has spent the past decade upgrading its military and is now fielding an entire new tank army on the EU’s eastern flank.

The EU is likely dealing with a lasting change in the global security architecture.

“In defense and defense industry, it is not Europe, it is 28 European states,” said Christian Mölling, deputy director of Germany’s DGAP research institute, who co-wrote a recent report outlining the shortfalls in the EU’s military muscle. “If you take trade, we are acting as one with a central and single policy, which makes us the biggest trading bloc in the world. But in defense, **we are not able to act as a huge force.”**

#### Even if European militarization succeeds, it ruins the U.S.-led liberal order---goes nuclear.

**Berlinski** 7-15-20**18** – PhD in IR @ Oxford (Claire, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan: Postwar U.S. statesmen designed our world order as it is for a reason. They had lived through what happened without it.,” *Politico*, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/15/trump-nato-europe-history-dependence-219011>)

Trump’s NATO-bashing surprised no one. He has repeatedly suggested the United States’ postwar security architecture is a “bad deal,” one negotiated by weak and foolish “incompetents.” Foreign policy, in his view, is a zero-sum game; any benefit to another nation must of necessity be a loss for the United States. “NATO countries,” he declared on Twitter, “must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!” Unfair? A world that revolves around American military, economic and cultural power, and uses the U.S. dollar as its reserve currency? What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It **is a feature**. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. **This is an illusion**. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European **arms race**—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock. Charles de Gaulle believed the Anglophone world could not, in the long term, be trusted with French security. It led him to withdraw France from NATO’s military integrated command and launch an independent nuclear development program. The independent nuclear program was real, but the withdrawal from NATO wasn’t—a secret agreement kept France in NATO anyway. But, today, with other NATO members obliged to consider the costs and benefits of an independent accommodation with Russia and the risks and rewards of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle is saying from the grave, I told you so. The American-led world order, undergirded by the ideal of liberal democracy, has been highly imperfect. But it has been the closest thing to Utopia our fallen and benighted species has ever seen. Its benefits are not just economic, although those benefits are immense. Its benefits must be measured in wars not fought, lives not squandered. Yet many Americans have turned their backs on history and reality alike. Let us hope pride does not prevent them from realizing this mistake before it’s far too late

#### NATO vital to European stability

Hal Brands | Bloomberg June 29, 2022 at 7:32 a.m. EDT The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies The West Must Move East for NATO to Survive https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-west-must-move-east-for-nato-to-survive/2022/06/29/35087340-f779-11ec-81db-ac07a394a86b\_story.html

The leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are in Madrid for the alliance’s most consequential summit in a generation. NATO appears to have overcome Turkish diplomatic blackmail to bring in two new members, Sweden and Finland. It must approve a new concept for transatlantic security amid Russia’s ongoing assault on Ukraine.

Not least, the alliance — and the US — will confront an inconvenient reality: Even if the Ukraine war takes a heavy toll on Russia, NATO will need a stronger presence in Eastern Europe than it possessed before the conflict.

Since Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO has had a tripwire strategy for defending its easternmost members. The alliance sprinkled a few thousand troops across Poland and the Baltic States. And it chose to rotate those forces in and out rather than stationing them there permanently, in part due to cost and in part out of respect for a 1997 agreement with Russia that Moscow had already egregiously violated.

Such a modest force could not withstand a major Russian attack. It could, however, ensure that U.S. and other NATO troops would be killed, thereby setting off a larger, decisive Western response.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, the Pentagon has sent additional forces into Eastern Europe: It now has roughly 10,000 troops in Poland, 2,500 in Romania and 2,000 in the Baltic States. The larger US contingent in Germany has also been reinforced, now at roughly 40,000 personnel. The goal was to ensure that Russia, perhaps emboldened by what many analysts thought would be an easy subjugation of Ukraine, was not tempted to take its aggression into NATO territory.

Yet Russia stumbled into a bloody mess, suffering massive losses of infantry, armor, special operations forces and other capabilities. The Kremlin’s bungling of the invasion also raised questions about how highly to rate those troops that remain.

Russia’s blunders have led some NATO members, such as France and Italy, to argue that greater forward presence in the east is now unnecessary. And with European countries ramping up defense spending, one also hears arguments that the US should leave any additional security measures in Europe to the Europeans and consummate its perpetually postponed “pivot to Asia” instead.

Those are bad ideas. The outcome in Ukraine is still in doubt, thanks to Moscow’s gains in the east and the south and to its severe attrition of Kyiv’s armed forces. Russia may still achieve a pared-down goal of seizing much of the Donbas and a “land bridge” to Crimea; one way or another, President Vladimir Putin has shown he can inflict terrible damage even with a terribly damaged military.

Well-informed analysts have also cautioned that Russia might do better in a conflict with NATO — the war it has trained and motived its forces to fight — than it has done in Ukraine.

The current conflict has reminded us, moreover, that we still really don’t know Putin’s mind. For years, his risk-taking has caught even the smartest Kremlin-watchers by surprise.

Most important, Ukraine has shown why a tripwire defense of Eastern Europe isn’t enough: It requires frontline states to see key portions of their territory conquered and then wait patiently for liberation.

That has always been a nasty scenario, because it could allow Russia to grab a chunk of land and then use nuclear threats to deter NATO from fighting back. It looks even uglier now that the world knows exactly what crimes Russian forces perpetrate — rape, murder, torture and other horrific abuses. The problem with a tripwire strategy, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said last week, is that being attacked by Russia means “complete destruction of countries and our culture.”

All the talk about enhanced European defense notwithstanding, there’s no good alternative to the US taking the initiative. The Ukraine war has been an object lesson in the value of American leadership: In the months prior to February 24, Washington repeatedly warned, on the basis of its unmatched intelligence capabilities, that Putin was deadly serious about invading — yet many European leaders were skeptical.

If the US were to decide that Europe can now look after itself, the result would be a weaker NATO riven by disputes between frontline states that rightly fear Putin and Western European states, such as France, that still hope for some diplomatic accommodation.

### Terrorism Mod

#### NATO prevents terrorism

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At the heart of the second pillar, the development of capabilities, is **NATO’s “defense against terrorism program of work”** (NATO, April 9, 2015). Its aim **is to develop innovative technologies to help prevent attacks and better protect troops and civilian infrastructure**. Under three umbrellas — **incident management, force protection and survivability, and network engagement** — **the program covers a wide variety of areas such as**: protecting against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs) or **CBRN** (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) **attacks**; countering improvised explosive devices (IED); biometric identification; protection of ports and harbors; and experimenting with non-lethal weapons. The program is run on the basis of common funding by all allies, and projects are led by individual NATO countries, with support and contributions from other member states. **The third pillar of NATO’s counter-terrorism activities is intended to contribute to regional stability through capacity building in partner countries.** As Secretary General Stoltenberg put it at the latest foreign ministerial meeting, “in the long run, it is much better to fight terrorism and project stability by training local forces, building local security institutions, instead of NATO deploying large numbers of our own combat troops in combat operations.” [2] It was in this spirit that in February 2017 the Alliance launched an in-country training program teaching Iraqi security forces to counter IEDs, while also continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan (al-Arabiya, January 24). Furthermore, in 2016 mobile counter-terrorism training courses were provided to Egypt, and training in counter-insurgency was provided to Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to Secretary General Stoltenberg, “the possible use of NATO’s mobile training teams and special operation forces headquarters is one of the different options [**NATO is] looking into [when it comes to deciding] what more we can do in general to fight terrorism”** (NATO, March 31). Beyond the three main areas identified by the 2012 Policy Guidelines, **NATO’s involvement in the fight against terrorism sometimes occurs in a more directly operational context.** In fact, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Alliance invoked Article 5 — NATO’s collective defense clause — for the first time in its history.

#### Extinction.

Marko M. **Krstic 17**. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Published in the Military Techinical Courier--Vol 65, Issue 2--a multidisciplinary scientific journal of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia. TENDENCY OF USING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES. 2017. scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0042-8469/2017/0042-84691702481K.pdf

The studies of a few cases of earlier CBRN actions have led experts to identify the key characteristics of terrorist groups that could potentially have an interest to use these weapons. It is thought that conservatism is inherent in terrorist organizations, but it must not be forgotten that some terrorists are inclined to innovations in weapons and tactics, as well as to taking risks in actions or in the choice of weapons. Many experts agree that most terrorist organizations want to use proven methods to achieve desired effects. Innovations, especially in the field of CBRN weapons, often indicate terrorists are likely to be led by other factors rather than by pure curiosity and desire to experiment. For some individuals, repression and democratic and strong rule of law are positive determinants of the emergence of CBRN actions which points to a new and more complex global security environment with an increasing risk of terrorists trying to perform a CBRN attack. It is a frightening fact that a **single terrorist** or isolated terrorist group could improvise a **biological weapon** or use other ways to spread anthrax, smallpox or other biological agents and thereby cause mass casualties and destroy the health care system of a state. CBRN weapons are secretly shipped to terrorists or hostile governments and represent a significant and growing threat to many countries. Although the threat of CBRN attacks is widely recognized as the central issue of national security, most analysts assume that the primary danger is a threat of the military use of these weapons in conventional wars with tra-ditional military means while the **threat** of covert attacks, which include terrorism, is rashly and **unfairly neglected.** Covert attacks are difficult to deter or prevent and **CBRN weapons suitable for this type of attack are available to a growing number of enemy states and groups**. At the same time, restrictions on their use appear to be diminishing, and so-called new terrorists do not always escalate and become apparent only by using unconventional weapons. These weapons are easily spread or transmitted from person to person, have a high mortality rate and a potential impact on public health, causing mass casualties that can crush health systems and cause public panic and social disruption, thus requiring special efforts to suppress them. When assessing the threat of CBRN weapons, we should take into account the change in capacity to carry out terrorist attacks that are on the rise among countries and non-government elements. Analysts believe that the fear of chemical and biological terrorist attacks is excessive, they point out that, in the past, very few attacks involved these weapons, and even those few attempts that have occurred were mostly thwarted by the authorities. A relative ease with which biological weapons can be obtained, along with other current changes and turbulences in the world, sets the stage for another type of warfare in the 21st century. The potential for CBRN terrorism has widely grown since 11 September, when some of these materials were used. The danger of terrorist use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction represents a very serious threat for many countries; if a terrorist group could gain access to this weapon, it is highly likely it would use it, or threaten to use it. Although there is very little information on terrorists and their ability to come into possession of nuclear weapons or on their intentions to get them, the risk of CBRN weapons has certainly increased since the terrorists started to become more familiar with these agents and their harmful consequences. Discovering the nature of the threat of biological weapons, as well as the appropriate response to them requires an emphasis on the biological characteristics of these instruments of war and terror. Preparing for a terrorist attack may seem daunting and there are a small number of people with practical experience and a good knowledge of CBRN weapons, because until recently there was no need to own them. In the past, most of the planning regarding emergency response to terrorism concentrated on the concerns of open attacks (bombing). However, the threats of CBRN weapons are taken seriously, especially in the USA, where media, fascinated by new weapons of mass destruction, encourage a growing fear for public safety. Terrorists who have significant human and material resources are much more likely to realize their intentions than lone perpetrators or small terrorist groups. A CBRN terrorism threat is certainly a matter of concern; however, terrorists will face many obstacles in the implementation of an attack of this kind. This includes the acquisition of materials and preparation for spreading them as well as a selection and a survey of a chosen objective and a correct dose required to achieve a desired effect. The growing threat of CBRN terrorism Terrorism can be defined as a deliberate act of violence intended to cause damage, but also to create an appropriate political and ideological situation, so that the use of these non-traditional weapons of terror outside the context is obvious, and the goals will not be military, but civilian ones (Bioterrorism, chemical weapons, and radiation terrorism, nd). Toxic substances, regardless of whether they are of animal, vegetable or mineral origin, were used throughout the history for political assassinations and sabotage; despite the risk of severe penalties, the prospects for success favoured the use of toxic substances. Such use has always been reduced, however, since only a small number of people had access to substances and possessed the ability of learn how to use them (Pascal, 1999). CBRN weapons are rightly viewed with a special sense of horror, their effects can be devastating and indiscriminating, and they take the most stringent toll among the most vulnerable population, non-combatants (e.g. a biological attack cannot be detected sufficiently fast after the disease spreads through the population). Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are a particularly attractive alternative for groups that do not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and this risk raises complex but important ethical issues (London, 2003). The common name for CBRN terrorism which causes the death of a large number of people, large scale damage and a strong echo worldwide is post-industrial or hyper-terrorism. This means that non-state elements possess and dispose of assets that were previously held only by states, but unlike them, which often fear reprisals after WMD attacks, terrorists, having no geographical location, are ready to use WMD with much less scrupulousness and fear (Kurmnik, Ribnikar, 2003). Some authors have described the factors that make chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks in many ways unique and demanding, such as an element of surprise, invisible agents, ordnance, the risk of repetition and new types of risks (Ruggiero, Voss, 2015). In the past 30 years, the use of CBRN weapons has become a major concern for many nations around the world. The public has become insensitive to traditional terrorist attacks that seem to be a less efficient way for terrorist organizations to achieve their goals. What causes shock and fear is actually presenting the properties of weapons which can be used by terrorist organizations to enhance their efforts and the effectiveness of attacks. CBRN terrorism is often a synonym for weapons of mass destruction, although this form of terrorism and related incidents do not require attacks and inflicting harm to large numbers of people - they do not even require deadly attacks at all. The number of studies on this type of terrorism is limited due to the lack of available data on this terrorism type. There is a very small number of databases of CBRN incidents, and even the existing ones have relatively little to do with them and they are compared to conventional terrorism (Jesse, 2012). Some experts emphasize the factors that promote such attacks and these factors include the availability of information and expertise, increased frustration of terrorists, demonization of the target population, as well as a millennial, apocalyptic or messianic vision. Experts also differ in opinion when it comes to possible perpetrators of CBRN incidents, and include religious fundamentalists and cults1 as possible perpetrators of such attacks, especially when these groups address to ethereal audience, emphasizing the hatred of unbelievers (Ivanova, Sandler, 2007). Concerns about super terrorism which involves the use of CBRN weapons are mainly focused on what terrorists can do in the context of our social reality, with an emphasis on terrorist motivations, initiatives and limitations. When considering which terrorist groups may be inclined to commit CBRN terrorism, it is important to recognize the spectrum of these acts, as well as to analyze the following categorization: (a) massive casualty events produced by conventional weapons; (b) CBRN scams; (c) conventional attack on a nuclear facility; (d) limited-scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; (e) large scale chemical or biological attack or a radiological dispersion; and (f) CBRN strikes (super terrorism) that can lead to thousands of victims. In addition to the motivation and willingness to inflict mass casualties in any way, terrorists must have technical and financial capabilities to come into possession of material and acquire skills for these types of weapons and materials and carry out a successful attack. Chemical and biological weapons can pose a risk to terrorists thus deterring them from using such weapons (Post, 2005, pp.148-151). The possibility that terrorists use chemical or biological substances may increase over the next decade, according to US intelligence agencies. According to CIA2 , an interest among non-state actors, including terrorists, for biological and chemical materials is real and growing, and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The agency also noted that many of these groups had developed an international network and did not need to rely on state sponsors for financial and technical support. However, it is believed that it is less likely that terrorists would choose chemical and biological weapons over conventional explosives, because these weapons are difficult to control and their results are unpredictable (Condesman, Burke, 2001). The risk of CBRN weapons is growing since terrorists are better acquainted with these agents and their potential for causing harm3 . These agents possess desirable characteristics as weapons of terror; they are biologically invisible to the naked eye, odorless and potentially lethal in the form of particles; natural organisms are so readily available, and can be "camouflaged" in natural disasters and used to spread fear and various diseases. Chemical agents quickly attack the critical physiological centers of the body, disabling or killing the victim. Biological and chemical weapons require the application of huge amounts of resources and result in different effects, causing fear and panic in the contaminated areas. Often referred to as "weapons of mass destruction", but, in medical terms, they are weapons of potential mass casualties because they can lead to massive death toll in the absence of preventive measures and timely response (Meyer, Spinella, 2014, pp.645-656). "Bioterrorism is the intentional use of microorganisms or toxins derived from living organisms used for hostile purposes intended to cause disease or death in man, animals and plants, on which they depend". The threat of bioterrorist attacks is real, and each individual is a potential terrorist, when terrorists are "invisible" prior to an attack which also can be "invisible" in the form of causing infectious disea-ses or epidemics. Citizens who are not aware they are infected are potential safety hazard and so-called dangerous bodies (Mijalković, 2011). In the last ten years, the issue of CBRN weapons has attracted the attention of experts, but a list of priorities by the heads of states has never been established. Biological weapons almost became forgotten after they had been banned by the 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons. A significant attention was paid to them during the 90s of the last century. The important thing is that biological weapons attract much less attention than other similar weapons, but probably represent the greatest danger, and in addition to their use in war, they are available as instruments of terror in peace. Some countries showed willingness to use such weapons against defenseless populations to achieve strategic objectives, and in this regard, some analysts believe that those who attacked the World Trade Center in 1993 applied cyanide on their bombs (this was not confirmed, but a large amount of cyanide was found in possession of the perpetrators). Such a group will prove to be less inefficient, because if terrorists decide to shock and surprise the government by inflicting enormous damage, CBRN weapons will become more attractive and more accessible (Bettis, 1998). Motives and forms of behavior of individuals and groups who acquired or used CBRN weapons have existed since long ago and there is no doubt that modern society is vulnerable to such attacks (Tucker, 2000). Fear of biological terrorism is certainly greater than the fear of the conventional forms of terrorism; some of these fears are justified and some are often exaggerated. Some agents are really very contagious and deadly, and if used properly, have a potential to result in casualties similar to those in a nuclear attack. Perhaps the scariest aspect of biological weapons is that the body is attacked without warning, people are afraid of the threat as it is invisible, and cannot be heard or felt. The history of warfare, terrorism and crime involving biological agents in the last century is considerably less dangerous and more deadly than the history of conventional warfare (Parachini, 2001). Today, some states and some terrorist groups can more **easily overcome** technological **barriers** due to the increased flow of **info**rmation and **access** to previously unavailable **tech**nologies. **Along with nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are part of an unholy trinity of weapons of mass destruction** (Davis, Johnson-Winegar, 2000, pp.15-28). The **society is now faced with the threat of an apocalyptic and asymmetric war scenario** in which kamikaze attackers are able to arm themselves with WMD4 without even having to have a "physical" weapon to create fear; they probably still prefer simple, proven methods: a stampede in an enclosed place, or just an explosive device, which will kill many people5 (Palmer, 2004, pp.3-9). Early detection and response to biological or chemical terrorism are crucial to solving this problem (U.S. Congress House, 2003, p.117).

### Terrorism Mod – Extension

#### NATO allows bases to be forwardly deployed. Preempts terror.

Burns 4/2/19 [Nicholas Burns, a U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2001-2005, is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School. Douglas Lute, a U.S. ambassador to NATO from 2013-2017, is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center. NATO’s biggest problem is President Trump. April 2, 2019.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df\_story.html]

NATO is **still** the world’s **strongest military alliance**. But its **single greatest danger** is the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time in its history. Starting with NATO’s founding father, President Harry S. Truman, each of our presidents has considered NATO a vital American interest. President Trump has taken a dramatically different path.

As former U.S. ambassadors to NATO, we interviewed alliance leaders past and present for a new Harvard Belfer Center report: “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Nearly all viewed Trump as NATO’s most urgent and difficult problem.

Never before has NATO had a U.S. leader who didn’t appear to believe deeply in NATO itself. During his first two years in office, Trump has questioned NATO’s core commitment embedded in Article 5 of the alliance’s founding treaty — that an attack on one of the allies will be considered an attack on all. He has been weak and reactive in defending NATO against its most aggressive adversary, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump has also been a consistent critic of European democratic leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while publicly supporting anti-democratic populists such as Hungarian President Viktor Orban. Trump is the first president to call the European Union a “foe,” rather than a partner, of the United States.

Fortunately, the vast majority of Republican and Democratic leaders in Congress disagree with Trump on NATO’s value to the United States. They should vote to approve the bills working their way through committees that would reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Article 5 and to require congressional approval should Trump try to diminish our commitment to NATO — or to pull the United States out altogether. Congress would be acting in unison with the public’s strong support for NATO, according to a 2018 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Critics who agree with Trump present three main arguments for why he is right to question NATO. First, they say NATO’s core job was finished with the end of the Cold War. That ignores, however, Russia’s campaign to destabilize NATO members Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It also ignores Putin’s attacks on the U.S. and European elections in 2016-2018, designed to weaken our democracies from within. Containing Russian power until Putin’s Soviet-trained generation passes from the scene remains a core NATO aim. And, as our report shows, there are new challenges beyond Russia confronting the alliance.

Second, Trump has claimed the allies are “taking advantage of us.” Low European defense spending is indeed a problem for NATO’s future. Germany, in particular, must do much more. But NATO allies have produced real growth in defense spending for four consecutive years, starting with Putin’s annexation of Crimea — a collective increase of $87 billion. On this issue, Trump would be smart to continue to push but while doing so strive to transform himself from chief critic into the unifying leader NATO desperately needs.

A third criticism is that NATO no longer contributes significantly to U.S. security in the world. Consider the facts: Canada and the European allies came to our defense on 9/11 and invoked the Article 5 mutual-defense clause of the treaty. They viewed Osama bin Laden’s attack on the United States as an attack on them as well. NATO allies went into Afghanistan with us where they and partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths. Most of those countries remain on the ground with our soldiers to this day.

NATO allies have also fought with us in the successful campaign to defeat the Islamic State caliphate in Syria and Iraq. They conduct counterterror operations with us in Africa. The European allies have assumed full responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia and the bulk of the burden in Kosovo.

U.S. air and naval bases in allied countries also bring the **U**nited **S**tates a continent closer to contain Russia in Eastern Europe and confront **terrorist threats** in the **Mid**dle **East** and **South Asia**. This is a **decisive advantage** for the **U**nited **S**tates. The reality is that NATO is a net plus for the United States in political, economic and military terms.

In the decade ahead, the **U**nited **S**tates will fight **two battles** with authoritarian powers **China and Russia**. The first is a battle of ideas that will center on Moscow’s and Beijing’s growing confidence in the superiority of their own systems. We will need the **full weight** of our **democratic allies** in NATO to **repudiate** the **authoritarian model** in this intensifying global debate just as Presidents John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan did in the past.

NATO allies will also be critical in a battle of **tech**nology, as the West competes with a more assertive China in **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence, quantum computing and biotechnology. The **U**nited **S**tates has a better chance to maintain its qualitative military edge over China if we enlist the scientific and productive capacity of all our allies in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific. **NATO remains** the **great power differential** between the **U**nited **S**tates and **Russia and China**, which have no real allies of their own.

### Cyber Deterrence Mod

#### NATO cohesion solves cyber attacks

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While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on the idea of collective defense, the nature of security threats has changed since its inception. The Cold War-era alliance is struggling to adapt to evolving technology and the altered nature of warfare. Nowhere is this more true than in the cyber realm. NATO policymakers have acknowledged cyberwarfare as a distinct sphere of conflict, but they have not yet tailored nuclear-era concepts of deterrence and response to this new domain. As cyberattacks increase in destructive potential and remain difficult to attribute, the alliance face the dilemma of whether and how to adapt their policy of strategic ambiguity to a new era of cyberwarfare. At their annual summit last month, the twenty-nine allies [reaffirmed the integral role](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm) cybersecurity plays in NATO, creating a Cyberspace Operations Center to supplement existing cyber defense facilities and reaffirming the need for an offensive capability “to deter, defend against, and to counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Missing from the communique, however, were any rules of engagement for the cyber sphere. This raises the question: How would NATO respond if a member state were to invoke [Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty](https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_110496.htm) following a cyberattack? The NATO alliance has long maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity when it comes to nuclear policy, leaving open the possibility that a conventional attack might be met with a nuclear response. (By contrast, China and India have adopted “no–first use” policy for nuclear weapons.) NATO’s nascent cyber policy exhibits a similar ambiguity, intentionally leaving unclear how the alliance would react to a cyberattack. Rather than responding in kind, NATO might instead conduct conventional attacks, such as missile strikes, allowing for rapid escalation. Early cyberattacks were largely seen as low-stakes events: an inconvenience for the financial sector and dangerous for personal data, but not a threat to national security or justification for a military response. This is no longer necessarily the case. A coordinated Russian cyberattack [against a nuclear power plant](http://www.nti.org/analysis/atomic-pulse/cyberattacks-nuclear-power-plants-how-worried-should-we-be/) in Europe and the United States could have devastating consequences, were it to result in major radiation leaks. An [attack on a country’s electric grid](https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/ContingencyPlanningMemo31_Knake.pdf), a softer target, could in theory cause hundreds of billions of dollars in damage and put lives at risk as traffic lights stop working, hospitals lose power, and unrest erupts. Given these stakes, NATO has an obvious incentive to strengthen its capacity to deter and punish cyberattacks, including through conventional retaliation. A U.S. [Department of Defense memorandum](https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-cyberDeterrenceReport_02-28-17_Final.pdf) published in early 2017 stated that at least for the next decade, offensive cyber capabilities are likely to outpace cyber defense, making deterrence the most viable option. Both the [United States](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718) and [NATO](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/28/nato-assisting-ukrainian-cyber-defences-ransom-ware-attack-cripples/) also recognize that a devastating cyberattack could quickly escalate to violent conflict by triggering a conventional response. Unfortunately, the alliance’s policy of strategic ambiguity falls short. By failing to define the rules of engagement for retaliation, the alliance leaves open the potential for chaos in determining an appropriate response to cyberattacks. In doing so, it invites adversaries to test the waters. Cyber deterrence is inherently more challenging than nuclear or conventional deterrence because such attacks are difficult to definitively attribute to a particular actor. For example, it is easier to mask the source of a cyberattack on a power grid than it would have been for the Warsaw Pact to conceal a massive incursion into West Germany. This attribution problem could complicate NATO’s capacity to conclusively determine the source of a cyberattack and justify and conduct a timely conventional response, particularly if member states diverge in their perceptions. This dilemma could strain the foundations of collective defense and undermine any unified front against cyberattacks. For NATO to commit to military action, all of its members would need certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt, about the identity of the perpetrator. This is particularly true in the case of Russia—a known sponsor of cyberattacks. Without conclusive proof, it might be a challenge to convince a distant country like Portugal or a dangerously close one like Estonia to join in a counterattack. Complicating matters, such post-attack decisions would need to be made quickly, given Russia’s [precedent of using cyberwarfare](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html) as a precursor to kinetic invasion. The need for speed leaves little room for philosophical debates over what constitutes an act of war. To be sure, NATO’s strategic ambiguity is not without its benefits. Uncertainty about the threshold for a military response could persuade an adversary not to push the envelope with an audacious attack. But that same ambiguity could lead an adversary to miscalculate. Moreover, the doctrine also leaves open the possibility of discord in the ranks of NATO member states regarding how to deal with any such attack. NATO’s policy of strategic ambiguity served it well during the long Cold War nuclear confrontation. But it may be less appropriate to the era of cyberwarfare, particularly given the problem of attribution and the potential for inter-allied disagreement on the appropriate response to any particular incident. NATO policymakers need to resolve this dilemma by formulating a more explicit cyberwarfare doctrine to which all of its member states can adhere. This should include updating their mutual understanding of what constitutes an act of aggression under NATO’s collective defense provisions, making explicit to potential adversaries just what its red lines are, and establishing clear procedures and channels for robust allied response to cyberattacks. Unless NATO clarifies current ambiguities, Russian aggression in the cyber realm could go unchecked.

**Cyberattacks trigger tit-for-tat exchanges culminating in war---goes nuclear**

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Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.[12](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.[13](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote12) The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”[14](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation#endnote14) These are by no means the only pathways to escalation resulting from the offensive use of cyberweapons. Others include efforts by third parties, such as proxy states or terrorist organizations, to provoke a global nuclear crisis by causing early-warning systems to generate false readings (“spoofing”) of missile launches. Yet, they do provide a clear indication of the severity of the threat. As states’ reliance on cyberspace grows and cyberweapons become more powerful, the dangers of unintended or accidental escalation can only grow more severe.

### Climate Change Mod

#### NATO cooperation and cohesion solves pandemics, bioD loss and climate change

Sherri Goodman and Katarina Kertysova, 22, (Sherri Goodman, Katarina Kertysova, 2-1-2022, NATO Review, NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html, 6-27-2022) SCade

NATO’s climate security agenda

Climate change has long been known as a threat multiplier and is increasingly recognised as a “shaping threat” that dramatically alters the environments in which Allied militaries will have to operate in the coming decades. From higher frequency and intensity of storms, through extreme heat and cold, to reduced supplies of drinking water and faster wear and tear of military equipment, climate change has significant implications for NATO on the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In addition to climate-related risks to military infrastructure and force readiness, more extreme weather events can also increase conflict and migration potential in and beyond NATO’s immediate neighbourhood. Born of the Cold War and designed to defend its members against any external aggression, NATO is evolving to reflect the new security reality of actorless threats, such as pandemics, biodiversity loss and climate change. As a security organisation, NATO cannot be indifferent to these challenges. For NATO to be able to fulfil its core mission of keeping the Euro-Atlantic space safe, building resilience to the impacts of a changing climate and integrating sustainable practices into military planning and capability development is a necessity, not a choice. Evolving consensus The good news is that the Alliance is not starting from scratch. For over 50 years now, NATO has been paying attention to environmental challenges, mostly through a wide range of scientific research activities. NATO has also developed six environmental protection standards (STANAGs) that concern military camps, management of waste, and sustainability of military training areas. Climate change was written into the 2010 Strategic Concept and has been factored into summit declarations since then. In 2014, NATO adopted a Green Defence Framework and integrated energy efficiency and other environmental considerations into the design of the current NATO headquarters, which was completed in 2018. The building blocks for a more ambitious and visible role with respect to climate security are already there. However, NATO as an alliance of 30 countries works by consensus, which is always evolving. As a former UN Special Envoy on Climate Change, Jens Stoltenberg began advocating for NATO to take greater climate-related action many years ago, but his efforts may have been stymied during the previous U.S. administration. The growing number of climate and weather related disasters, which continue to impact lives and livelihoods both within and outside of NATO’s borders, has marked an evident shift in awareness and acceptance of climate change as an issue of national security across the Alliance. In view of increasing societal pressure and the current political momentum, which includes the renewed U.S. leadership on climate change, NATO is now poised to push a more ambitious climate agenda.

Causes extinction

Spratt 18, David, Research Director, Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, \*\*Ian T. Dunlop, Chairman of Safe Climate Australia, Director of Australia 21, Deputy Convener of the Australian Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, a Fellow of the Centre for Policy Development, and a member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Climate Change Task Force ( “What Lies Beneath: The Understatement of Existential Climate Risk”, Accessible at: <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a0d7c18a1bf64e698a9c8c8f18a42889.pdf>)

In 2016, the World Economic Forum survey of the most impactful risks for the years ahead elevated the failure of climate change mitigation and adaptation to the top of the list, ahead of weapons of mass destruction, ranking second, and water crises, ranking third. By 2018, following a year characterised by high-impact hurricanes and extreme temperatures, extreme-weather events were seen as the single most prominent risk. As the survey noted: “We have been pushing our planet to the brink and the damage is becoming increasingly clear.”29 Climate change is an existential risk to human civilisation: that is, an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. Temperature rises that are now in prospect, after the Paris Agreement, are in the range of 3–5°C. At present, the Paris Agreement voluntary emission reduction commitments, if implemented, would result in planetary warming of 3.4°C by 2100,30 without taking into account “long-term” carbon cycle feedbacks. With a higher climate sensitivity figure of 4.5°C, for example, which would account for such feedbacks, the Paris path would result in around 5°C of warming, according to a MIT study.31 A study by Schroder Investment Management published in June 2017 found – after taking into account indicators across a wide range of the political, financial, energy and regulatory sectors – the average temperature increase implied for the Paris Agreement across all sectors was 4.1°C.32 Yet 3°C of warming already constitutes an existential risk. A 2007 study by two US national security think-tanks concluded that 3°C of warming and a 0.5 metre sea-level rise would likely lead to “outright chaos” and “nuclear war is possible”, emphasising how “massive non-linear events in the global environment give rise to massive nonlinear societal events”.33 The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) explains what could happen: “If climate change was to reach 3°C, most of Bangladesh and Florida would drown, while major coastal cities – Shanghai, Lagos, Mumbai – would be swamped, likely creating large flows of climate refugees. Most regions in the world would see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, whether heat waves, floods or storms. This likely scenario for a 3°C rise does not take into account the considerable risk that self-reinforcing feedback loops set in when a certain threshold is reached, leading to an ever increasing rise in temperature. Potential thresholds include the melting of the Arctic permafrost releasing methane into the atmosphere, forest dieback releasing the carbon currently stored in the Amazon and boreal forests, or the melting of polar ice caps

### Climate Change Mod - Extension

#### Unilateral action is insufficient to solve pressing international threats

Joseph Bodnar, 20, (Joseph Bodnar, Joseph Bodnar is a graduate student at American University’s School of International Service. His writing has appeared in the Dallas Morning News and several national security publications, including the Atlantic Council’s New Atlanticist blog., 12-8-2020, National Interest, NATO Has a Role to Play in Fighting Climate Change, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato-has-role-play-fighting-climate-change-174051, 6-27-2022) SCade

Climate change can’t be deterred or defeated by military action, but militaries can be part of the solution. NATO’s new forward-looking report, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, recognizes the role that the transatlantic alliance can play in slowing ecological breakdown and offers a series of proposals to help address the crisis. The 138 recommendations that fill out this new strategic framework could bury its reaffirmation of climate change as a driver of the global security environment. But it shouldn’t. Against a backdrop of resurgent great power competition and technological disruption, the threat posed by the warming planet stands alone in scope and scale. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg—a former Deputy Environment Manager of Norway and UN Special Envoy on Climate Change—has repeatedly acknowledged that “climate change is one of the biggest challenges of our time.” Global warming has made extreme weather more intense and more frequent; displaced millions; aggrevated tensions around food, water and energy security; and added complexity and contention to geopolitics. For NATO, this means increased demands for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, more of the volatility that extremist ideologies depend upon, and a broader, messier threat landscape. Flooding, droughts, and wildfires have also impacted military readiness around the world. The NATO 2030 report recommends the creation of a Centre for Excellence on Climate and Security, which would monitor and assess the security implications of climate change. This enhanced situational awareness would enable NATO to anticipate, adapt, and act to meet the challenges posed by climate change. Collecting and sharing climate intelligence will be central to predicting future threats to safety and security. The report also highlights the strategic significance of the High North and the Arctic, where melting ice has made waters more accessible, more vulnerable to exploitation, and more contested. With geopolitical tensions filling the space left open by retreating cold and ice, the report stresses the need to develop a strategy of deterrence and defense in these waters to ensure freedom of navigation is upheld and aggressive moves by state actors are checked. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the report emphasizes the need to implement better green technology and smart energy. This is critical. The carbon footprints of NATO militaries are massive. The U.S. military alone releases more greenhouses gas than 140 countries, emitting more than 25,000 kilotons of carbon dioxide a year. The current push for increased military spending and burden-sharing must be coupled with a commitment to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Purchasing military equipment for security that accelerates climate change is self-sabotage at an existential level. Stoltenberg has also noted that a shift to renewable energy, such as solar and wind, will increase NATO’s self-sufficiency and in turn its operational independence and flexibility. NATO’s success rests on its members’ credible commitments to act collectively against shared threats. Climate change cuts to the core of this mission. Flooding, fire, disease, famine, increased migrant flows, economic disruption, political and social instability, and new arenas of great power competition all stem from the same threat. NATO must adapt and do everything within its mandate to meet this reality.

### A2 Arctic

#### NATO in the Artic deters conflict – only chance to prevent lashout

Taha, Mahmoud. 2022. “Will the Arctic Become a New Battlefield between Russia and NATO? | Al-Estiklal Newspaper.” Al-Estiklal Newspaper. 2022. <https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/13240/will-the-arctic-become-a-new-battlefield-between-russia-and-nato>. /nfs

‌ Little by little, the scope of the confrontation between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is expanding to reach the various spheres of influence and lines of contact between them in the world, even those remote and dormant, as is the case in the Arctic region, which does not seem to be immune from the fires of the Ukraine war. The resource-rich Arctic region is also a point of contact between Russia, a number of NATO members, and two of the alliance's most important friends, Finland and Sweden, which are now openly expressing their desire to join NATO, according to sources quoted by The Times a few days ago. On the other hand, the new Russian threats to resort to a policy of nuclear deterrence have raised the world's fears that Moscow might take a reckless step that seemed likely over the past weeks. At a time when tension is escalating between Russia and NATO against the backdrop of the Ukrainian-Russian war and the request of Sweden and Finland to join the alliance, Moscow is increasingly concerned about the latter's involvement of non-Arctic members in its military activities near Russia's borders. As a result, Russia has warned of the risks of an unintended clash between Russia and NATO in the Arctic and the impact on the European security system. In turn, the Ambassador for Special Missions in the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nikolay Korchunov, who chairs the Committee of Senior Officials of the Arctic Council, expressed in a statement to the Russian TASS Agency on April 17, 2022, Moscow's concern about NATO's involvement of its members from outside the Arctic region in its military activities there. “Another large-scale military exercise has recently taken place in northern Norway, which may lead to an increased risk of unintended accidents that would cause significant damage to the Arctic ecosystem, in addition to the security risks it brings,” he added. The Russian official explained that “if Sweden and Finland join NATO, this will harm security in the Arctic,” noting that “the long-term commitment of Stockholm and Helsinki during the past decades to the policy of non-alignment of military alliances was an important factor in stability and security in the northern European region and on the European continent as a whole.” Last March, Finland, and Sweden, both of which are considering joining the US-led Western military alliance, held joint military exercises with the alliance, as those exercises had been scheduled for a long time, but Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 made them more important. ‘The Cold Response 2022 exercise’ is considered the largest exercise by NATO in the [Artic] region in the last thirty years. About 30,000 soldiers from 27 countries, including NATO partners Finland and Sweden, participated in it, in addition to about 220 aircraft and more than 50 warships. The stated goal was that NATO wants to make its soldiers more solid in fighting in the bitter cold on land, sea, and air, including in the Arctic. Russia's conflict against its counterparts in the Arctic was not a product of the moment, but rather has become a backyard for global conflicts, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that NATO cannot allow a security vacuum to occur in the Arctic. “The lack of the alliance's presence in the Arctic fuels Russian ambitions, exposes NATO, and leads to miscalculation and misunderstanding,” he considered. It is noteworthy that the Arctic Council is an intergovernmental organization of the Arctic countries, namely Denmark, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Canada, Norway, the United States, Finland, Sweden, and Russia. In 2021, when the Council celebrated its 25th anniversary, its presidency passed to Russia for two years. Over the past weeks, all countries of the Arctic Council except for Russia issued a written statement refusing to participate in any Council meetings chaired by Russia or on Russian soil due to the Ukraine war.

#### NATO deters Russia from Arctic conflict

Lawrence, Quil. 2022. Quals: New York-based correspondent for NPR News, covering veterans' issues nationwide. He won a Robert F. Kennedy Award for his coverage of American veterans and a Gracie Award for coverage of female combat veterans. In 2019 Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America honored Quil with its IAVA Salutes Award for Leadership in Journalism. https://www.npr.org/2022/04/15/1091492248/nato-arctic-war-game-had-a-cold-war-feel

"The US let some of that capability atrophy after the end of the cold war. Now we have, in the last few years, really paid more attention to the need to restore our icebreaker fleet, and also to be able to equip our forces to operate in colder weather and more dangerous conditions," said Sherri Goodman, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense. Goodman says Russia still has a huge advantage in the Arctic though - about 50 ice-breaking vessels, compared to America's two coast guard ships. And she's worried that melting sea ice, new shipping routes, and a race for new mining and drilling in the Arctic present opportunities for crisis with Russia. Especially since Vladimir Putin is now a pariah. "We have entered an era in the Arctic of cold peace at best, where Russia is less tethered to the Arctic institutions that have provided stability for the last quarter century. While it doesn't mean we are heading into an armed conflict, we are heading into an area where deterrence and defense will play a larger role," said Goodman. At the same time that NATO practiced in Arctic Norway, the US ran a similar exercise with [8,000 troops in Alaska](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/27/us/army-alaska-arctic-russia.html) along the Bering Sea, where Russia has stepped up military activity in recent years.

#### NATO can deter Arctic conflict

Taha, Mahmoud. 2022. “Will the Arctic Become a New Battlefield between Russia and NATO? | Al-Estiklal Newspaper.” Al-Estiklal Newspaper. 2022. <https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/13240/will-the-arctic-become-a-new-battlefield-between-russia-and-nato>. /nfs

According to a report released in late 2021 by Reclaim Finance, a non-governmental organization, there are currently 599 oil and gas fields in production, under appraisal, field development, or in the discovery phase within the Arctic region. Gazprom, the largest Russian energy company, has 74% of its reserves in the Arctic and ranks first in the list of companies in the Arctic, which also includes many American, French, British and Norwegian companies. According to a US Geological Survey report, a fifth of the world's undiscovered oil and natural gas lie under the Arctic ice sheet, along with significant reserves of diamonds, gold, platinum, nickel, and lead. The report added, “there are up to 90 billion barrels of oil in that region, which is the amount that the American needs for 12 years, and is almost equal to the UAE's oil reserves.” The Arctic also has, according to the American report, more than fifty trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which has led to the growing interest of the great powers in the Arctic, despite international treaties that stipulate that no one owns this pole. However, each country extends its borders to claim new lands in the hope of benefiting from the wealth of the Arctic, which has a population of two million people. In turn, the researcher in international relations Mahmoud Alloush stressed in a statement to Al-Estiklal that “there is Russian concern about the increase in Western military activity in the Arctic, because of the importance of the Arctic in terms of energy resources, minerals and fish reserves, and the shorter shipping routes between Asia and Europe.” “The Arctic could be home to the largest undiscovered oil and gas reserves on Earth, storing billions of barrels of untapped energy resources, all while fuel shortages caused by sanctions against Russia,” he continued. “International interest in the wealth of the Arctic is likely to increase in the coming period in conjunction with climate change and melting ice, which will force Russia to play a more dominant role in the region,” he added. There are agreements concluded between Arctic countries on maritime law, environmental balance, and security needs, but the participation of most of these countries in arming Ukraine would jeopardize these agreements with Russia, according to Alloush. The researcher noted that “the militarization of the situation in the Arctic in recent years can clearly be observed, Russia is increasing its military presence on the Russian Kola Peninsula, bordering the Arctic, where the most powerful fleet in the Russian Navy is located, as Russia also has the largest share of strategic submarines and other important non-nuclear capabilities.” As for the motives for turning the Arctic into a battleground for influence between Moscow and the West, Alloush explained that “the Ukraine war changed the rules of the game in the Arctic, although Russia was generally cooperative with Western countries in the Arctic, NATO has become more concerned about its military expansion in this particular region.” Regarding the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, Alloush indicated that “if this happened, all Arctic countries except Russia would be part of NATO, which Russia views as a threat to encircle its activities in the Arctic.” However, he said, “Russia's military presence in this region is stronger than the presence of other countries,” adding: “At the moment, NATO is studying how to expand its activity in the Arctic to balance Russia.”

#### No arctic war. Countries want stability.

SARAH CAMMARATA, 05/20/2020, [Sarah Cammarata is a digital producer for POLITICO Pro. She co-authors Afternoon Energy and contributes to Morning Defense, as well as defense policy coverage], “EU’s point man for the Arctic shrugs off Russia, China tension”, Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/20/europe-russia-arctic-china-272063>, Xoxo 5/31/2020

“Where the Arctic was [historically] reserved for the Arctic states, now it’s very much seen as an international area of interest, and I don't see that as being a problem as long as it’s well-handled,” said Mann, who took on his current role on April 1. A senior State Department official in a briefing late last month characterized this era as the “the return of geopolitics” in the Arctic, and warned “we can expect ... the rapidly changing Arctic system to create greater incentives for the Kremlin and the [People’s Republic of China] to pursue agendas that clash with the interests of the United States and our allies and partners.” Russia and the EU have their differences, which is “clear” to Mann, though it's historically been a place where the two entities have cooperated, he said. “I think one should avoid looking for flare-ups and tension where they don’t exist. That’s not to say that there won’t be in the future, but at the moment, things are running smoothly in my opinion.” The EU’s Arctic chief cited the Northern Dimension policy, a joint framework between EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland that promotes cooperation, economic competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe as an example. Also, a new international fisheries agreement, ratified by Norway on Sunday, is an “absolutely amazing achievement” that’s a “sign that people are able to agree on things,” he said. Mann noted that Russia and the EU are both part of the Barents-Euro Arctic Council, a forum to discuss issues in the Barents region — the stretch of land that runs along the Barents Sea. Many non-Arctic countries in the EU, and elsewhere, are now shifting to design their own Arctic strategies, something he said is a welcome move. Arctic policy has normally been left solely to the Arctic nations to hash out. “New players are playing a very serious role in the Arctic now, well at least China. That wasn’t the case perhaps four years ago,” Mann explained. The concern about new Arctic activities “depends on the country,” but he did not point out a specific area of unrest. U.S. and British warships sailed to the Barents Sea this month for the first time since the 1980s, sparking buzz about what the operations meant in a militarized Arctic. However, a Navy spokesperson said in a statement the operations were routine and are “the latest in a series of ships operating in the Arctic Circle in recent years.” Mann stressed that “it’s worth underlining that the Arctic has been, and currently is, a place of peaceful cooperation ... [which] has been rather good. One of the EU’s main goals in Arctic policy is to promote multilateral cooperation and keeping it an area of peace.” New commercial opportunities that arise alongside the Arctic’s sea ice melting is a main driver of growing interest in the region, but the northern sea lanes and how much new traffic there is increasing are “being slightly overplayed,” he said. The apparent rise in tensions has led international officials to call for a body or forum for nations to discuss security issues, which Mann agrees may not be a bad idea. The Arctic Council, composed of the eight Arctic states, is a forum for discussion on cooperation in the Arctic, though it’s not required to discuss security matters and instead focuses on work in environmental and sustainable development, and support for indigenous communities. “Any forum that comes together where dialogue is possible, is going to be a good thing. I can’t tell you now what form that should be,” he said.

### A2 Turkey

#### Engagement with Turkey is the best chance to prevent human rights abuses

Ellehuus 19 “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving” Dec 2nd, 2019 Rachel Ellehuus is the Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO. [https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving Accessed 7/3/22](https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving%20Accessed%207/3/22)

NATO leaders will gather this week in London to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the alliance; reflect on past accomplishments; implement the remaining deterrence and defense measures agreed at the 2014 Warsaw Summit; and lay the groundwork for future cooperation in new areas, such as emerging technologies and space. And while the military machinery that is the core of NATO continues to run smoothly—generating levels of interoperability, integrated operational planning, and force generation that are unmatched—NATO’s political cohesion is being challenged by both internal divisions among members and by external actors who seek to exploit these differences to their own advantage. Perhaps the most pronounced case of this fractured political cohesion is the Turkey-NATO relationship, where internal challenges and pressure from external actors uniquely intersect. Internally, allies are alarmed by President Erdogan’s walking back of democracy, press freedom, and civic society in Turkey; Turkey’s repeated unilateral incursions into northern Syria; and its willingness to hold the NATO agenda hostage to domestic concerns, for example, Turkey’s current hold on approving the Graduated Response Plan for the Baltic States and Poland pending NATO recognition of the threat posed to Turkey by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Conversely, Turkey (and many other southern flank allies for that matter) believes that NATO does not fully recognize or address its legitimate security concerns, in particular migration and terrorism. Externally, Russia quickly capitalized on the fissures between Turkey and NATO, offering to assist Turkey in managing the YPG along the Turkey-Syria border and to sell it Russian equipment, such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system, which would compromise NATO capabilities and has led to a halt in delivery of F-35 aircraft to Turkey. Turkey’s subsequent decisions to [fly its F-16 against the S-400](https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-tests-f-16s-with-russian-air-defense-system-s400-2019-11)over Ankara and to [enter negotiations with Russian on purchasing the Russian Su-35](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/10/28/turkey-russia-in-advanced-talks-on-potential-su-35-jet-deal/)fighter aircraft have reinforced concerns that Turkey has little interest in maintaining or rebuilding its relationship with NATO as instead plans to continue to test its boundaries. The EU-Turkey relationship is not faring much better, with accession negotiations (initiated in 2005) frozen since June 2018 due to Turkey’s backsliding on democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights. The 2016 EU-Turkey refugee agreement, whereby Turkey receives EU financial assistance in exchange for continuing to host some 3 million refugees, is creating further tension, with both sides accusing the other of not living up to the terms of the agreement. What’s next? Presently, mutual mistrust is so high that many allies are questioning whether Turkey still shares NATO’s interests and values, and many in Turkey are struggling to see the benefits of NATO membership or a renewed EU accession process. Both sides seem to have forgotten [the historical ties and shared interests that led Turkey to join NATO](https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-turkeys-intervention-us-diplomacy-and-crisis-syria#Rachel)in 1952, such as countering Russian (then Soviet) influence in Central Asia and the Middle East and maintaining stability in the Middle East. Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Active measures Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future**. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in N**

#### Turkey will be key to deterrence in the Black Sea theater

Tol 21 “Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot” Feb 16th, 2021 Gönül Tol is the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s [Turkey program](https://www.mei.edu/programs/turkish-studies) and a senior fellow for the [Frontier Europe Initiative](https://www.mei.edu/programs/frontier-europe). She is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies. After three years of field research in Germany and the Netherlands, she wrote her dissertation on the radicalization of the Turkish Islamist movement Milli Gorus in Western Europe. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot>

America’s presence in the Black Sea is important to check Russian expansionism, but a more effective strategy calls for a coordinated response from regional allies such as Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the U.S. in particular has been rocky of late. Ignoring warnings from NATO and the threat of sanctions from the U..S, Turkey went ahead with its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, taking delivery of the first shipment in mid-2019. But despite its growing defense partnership with Moscow, **Ankara is equally uneasy about the growing Russian military presence in a region where Turkey once had the edge**. In a 2016 plea to Turkey’s NATO allies, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and called for a greater NATO presence, reversing a decades-old Turkish policy of keeping the alliance out. Turkey has developed a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russian influence in the Black Sea. One important leg of that strategy is on the home front, where Turkey is strengthening its navy. A project called MILGEM, a contraction of the Turkish for “national ship” (milli gemi), was launched to design and construct naval vessels in-country, including ADA class corvettes. In 2018, the [Pakistani Navy signed a contract](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1178795282798202880?s=20) to acquire four of these ships from Turkey’s state-run defense contractor ASFAT, the first successful export of these vessels. Turkey has also been building up its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea by ordering four new frigates, called both Istanbul and MILGEM II. The frigates are based on the ADA class corvette design but extended by 14 meters to enable the inclusion of a vertical launching system for surface to air missiles. The naval version of the army’s[Korkut](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/970694646216249345?s=20) low-altitude air defense system, Gökdeniz, will be added to the inventory for the first time with the frigate. The national [Atmaca](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1191311364343681024?s=20) anti-ship missile will also be integrated into the first unit of the class, TCG Istanbul, which is forecast for entry into service later this year. Turkey is taking steps on the foreign policy front as well, stepping up its cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Ankara views these countries as instrumental in its efforts to balance the Russian military presence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkish-Ukrainian relations have expanded significantly. Last year, Erdoğan unveiled a $36 million military aid package for Ukraine. The two countries agreed to cooperate on the design and manufacture of aircraft engines, radar units, [drones](https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/status/1108309446034423808?s=20), and navigation systems and consider collaboration on advanced technology projects, such as ballistic missile systems. Turkey also plans to sell its ships to Ukraine as part of a much bigger defense deal, which, if it comes to fruition, could change the balance of power in the Black Sea. Besides cooperation in defense industries, the Ukrainian and Turkish navies also [conduct](https://www.newsweek.com/estranged-russia-turkey-and-ukraine-join-forces-447473) joint training in the Black Sea to showcase their ability to operate "in accordance with NATO standards." Turkey has also invested in shoring up the defenses of Georgia, another Black Sea country threatened by Russia’s growing influence in the region. Turkey has [allocated](https://turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/652-turkey%E2%80%99s-commitment-to-azerbaijan%E2%80%99s-defense-shows-the-limits-of-ankara%E2%80%99s-tilt-to-moscow.html) millions of dollars to the Georgian Ministry of Defense to reform the country’s military logistics and transfer defense capabilities to its northeastern neighbor while advocating for the extension of NATO membership to Georgia, a move Russia opposes. Turkey’s defense cooperation with Azerbaijan has been growing as well, which was on full display in the fighting in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh late last year, when Ankara threw its full military support behind Baku. Turkish drones provided Azerbaijan a huge advantage in the conflict, which ended with Azerbaijan capturing significant swathes of territory from Armenian forces. Turkey’s military exports to Azerbaijan rose six-fold in 2020, with Azerbaijan jumping to the top of the list of Turkish arms buyers in September. NATO and the Black Sea NATO should support these Turkish efforts. It should also establish a permanent “Black Sea Maritime Patrol” group modeled on the successful Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. Operation Sea Guardian is a flexible effort that can potentially cover the full range of NATO’s maritime security needs. In accordance with NATO’s “framework nation” concept, Turkey can be assigned the leading nation role in the Black Sea and smaller members can integrate their own, more limited capabilities into an organizational structure provided by Ankara. Mirroring other NATO missions in the Baltic or Mediterranean, Turkey can play a coordinating role to bring in other NATO allies willing to participate and provide support. Such a force would require NATO’s coordination and political pressure among non-Black Sea members to commit in advance to a regular and rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea, in line with the 1936 Montreux Convention, which limits the presence of warships from non-littoral states to a maximum of 21 days. Although the development of such a multinational unit would require a sustained diplomatic effort, once active, it would boost NATO’s deterrence in a strategic region that has become a springboard for Russia to project power from Georgia all the way to Syria and Libya.

#### NATO provides the quick ability to respond to genocide from Turkey

Martin Herem JUNE 23 2022 Please use the sharing tools found via the share button at the top or side of articles. Copying articles to share with others is a breach of [FT.com](https://www.ft.com) [T&Cs](https://help.ft.com/help/legal-privacy/terms-conditions/) and [Copyright Policy](https://help.ft.com/help/legal-privacy/copyright/copyright-policy/). Email [licensing@ft.com](mailto:licensing@ft.com) to buy additional rights. Subscribers may share up to 10 or 20 articles per month using the gift article service. More information can be [found here](https://www.ft.com/tour).   
<https://www.ft.com/content/48ba1732-8d3c-49e4-9ac6-5259a760356d>  
  
In light of the changed security environment, we need to double the speed and scale of our efforts to boost our military posture across the alliance. The overall aim is to be able to put in place a credible defence capability anywhere on Nato territory, from the very beginning of a conflict. We cannot wait for another massacre such as the one in Bucha to happen before taking action.

### A2 ILO

#### No impact to the liberal order

G. John Ikenberry 18, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs, <https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_survive.pdf>

In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting point is the classic “power transition” perspective. Power transition theories see a tight link between international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations, agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global order. And even as China seeks in various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed. But the overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy, and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order. These hegemonic realists argue that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power. Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.

#### International law fails—it lacks properties required for a legitimate system

**Steinberg 5** (Gerald M., Academic and political scientist, PhD in government from Cornell University, “The Myth of International Law” October 15, 2005, http://www.zionismontheweb.org/myth\_of\_international\_law.htm)

In this reality, the principles that are said to constitute “international law” lack the two central properties required for any legitimate legal system: the consent of the governed, and uniform and unprejudiced application. International law and the claims made in its name fit neither criteria. In a democratic framework, the legal system gains legitimacy through the consent of the citizens, and accountable to democratic procedures. We accept the limitations placed on us by the system of laws and the role of the police in enforcing these laws as part of the requirements for justice and order in any functioning society. But we do not accept limitations imposed from the outside, without our consent. Thus, the claims of the UN, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and campaigns run by obsessed extremists in Europe, lack any legitimate moral foundation or standing in democratic societies with their own legal system. Similarly, when judges sitting on the Israeli High Court base decisions on international law, they are attempting to impose an external framework which lacks the legitimacy provided by the consent of the governed. THE OTHER problem with the use of international law is the absence of equitable implementation. No legal system that focuses its attention selectively can be considered legitimate. Thus, the routine condemnations of Israeli or American policy by the UN, the ICJ, and accompanying NGOs have no moral or legal validity when the principles are not applied uniformly. In contrast to these destructive polemics, in order to promote a meaningful universal moral code, it is necessary to recognize the need for the consent of the governed and for consistent and universal enforcement. International law based on justice, and not ideology, remains a worthy objective. But the substitution of political rhetoric that invokes the myths and rhetoric for the real thing is entirely counterproductive.

## NATO Bad

### Arctic Mod

#### NATO destabilizes Arctic – tensions cause nuclear war – extinction

Michael T. Klare, 02-11-2020, (Michael T. Klare, The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC. Also wrote a cool book about climate and the pentagon budget),"A World War Could Break Out in the Arctic," The Nation, <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-russia-norway/>, Xoxo 6/30/2020

In early March, an estimated 7,500 American combat troops will travel to Norway to join thousands of soldiers from other NATO countries in a massive mock battle with imagined invading forces from Russia. In this futuristic simulated engagement—it goes by the name of Exercise Cold Response 2020—allied forces will “conduct multinational joint exercises with a high-intensity combat scenario in demanding winter conditions,” or so claims the Norwegian military anyway. At first glance, this may look like any other NATO training exercise, but think again. There’s nothing ordinary about Cold Response 2020. As a start, it’s being staged above the Arctic Circle, far from any previous traditional NATO battlefield, and it raises to a new level the possibility of a great-power conflict that might end in a nuclear exchange and mutual annihilation. Welcome, in other words, to World War III’s newest battlefield. For the soldiers participating in the exercise, the potentially thermonuclear dimensions of Cold Response 2020 may not be obvious. At its start, Marines from the United States and the United Kingdom will practice massive amphibious landings along Norway’s coastline, much as they do in similar exercises elsewhere in the world. Once ashore, however, the scenario becomes ever more distinctive. After collecting tanks and other heavy weaponry “prepositioned” in caves in Norway’s interior, the Marines will proceed toward the country’s far-northern Finnmark region to help Norwegian forces stave off Russian forces supposedly pouring across the border. From then on, the two sides will engage in—to use current Pentagon terminology—high-intensity combat operations under Arctic conditions (a type of warfare not seen on such a scale since World War II). And that’s just the beginning. Unbeknownst to most Americans, the Finnmark region of Norway and adjacent Russian territory have become one of the most likely battlegrounds for the first use of nuclear weapons in any future NATO-Russian conflict. Because Moscow has concentrated a significant part of its nuclear retaliatory capability on the Kola Peninsula, a remote stretch of land abutting northern Norway—any US-NATO success in actual combat with Russian forces near that territory would endanger a significant part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and so might precipitate the early use of such munitions. Even a simulated victory—the predictable result of Cold Response 2020—will undoubtedly set Russia’s nuclear controllers on edge. To appreciate just how risky any NATO-Russian clash in Norway’s far north would be, consider the region’s geography and the strategic factors that have led Russia to concentrate so much military power there. And all of this, by the way, will be playing out in the context of another existential danger: climate change. The melting of the Arctic ice cap and the accelerated exploitation of Arctic resources are lending this area ever greater strategic significance. ENERGY EXTRACTION IN THE FAR NORTH Look at any map of Europe and you’ll note that Scandinavia widens as it heads southward into the most heavily populated parts of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. As you head north, however, it narrows and becomes ever less populated. At its extreme northern reaches, only a thin band of Norway juts east to touch Russia’s Kola Peninsula. To the north, the Barents Sea, an offshoot of the Arctic Ocean, bounds them both. This remote region—approximately 800 miles from Oslo and 900 miles from Moscow—has, in recent years, become a vortex of economic and military activity. Once prized as a source of vital minerals, especially nickel, iron ore, and phosphates, this remote area is now the center of extensive oil and natural gas extraction. With temperatures rising in the Arctic twice as fast as anywhere else on the planet and sea ice retreating ever farther north every year, offshore fossil-fuel exploration has become increasingly viable. As a result, large reserves of oil and natural gas—the very fuels whose combustion is responsible for those rising temperatures—have been discovered beneath the Barents Sea and both countries are seeking to exploit those deposits. Norway has taken the lead, establishing at Hammerfest in Finnmark the world’s first plant above the Arctic Circle to export liquified natural gas. In a similar fashion, Russia has initiated efforts to exploit the mammoth Shtokman gas field in its sector of the Barents Sea, though it has yet to bring such plans to fruition. For Russia, even more significant oil and gas prospects lie further east in the Kara and Pechora Seas and on the Yamal Peninsula, a slender extension of Siberia. Its energy companies have, in fact, already begun producing oil at the Prirazlomnoye field in the Pechora Sea and the Novoportovskoye field on that peninsula (and natural gas there as well). Such fields hold great promise for Russia, which exhibits all the characteristics of a petro-state, but there’s one huge problem: The only practical way to get that output to market is via specially designed icebreaker-tankers sent through the Barents Sea past northern Norway. The exploitation of Arctic oil and gas resources and their transport to markets in Europe and Asia has become a major economic priority for Moscow as its hydrocarbon reserves below the Arctic Circle begin to dry up. Despite calls at home for greater economic diversity, President Vladimir Putin’s regime continues to insist on the centrality of hydrocarbon production to the country’s economic future. In that context, production in the Arctic has become an essential national objective, which, in turn, requires assured access to the Atlantic Ocean via the Barents Sea and Norway’s offshore waters. Think of that waterway as vital to Russia’s energy economy in the way the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, is to the Saudis and other regional fossil-fuel producers. THE MILITARY DIMENSION No less than Russia’s giant energy firms, its navy must be able to enter the Atlantic via the Barents Sea and northern Norway. Aside from its Baltic and Black Sea ports, accessible to the Atlantic only via passageways easily obstructed by NATO, the sole Russian harbor with unfettered access to the Atlantic Ocean is at Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula. Not surprisingly then, that port is also the headquarters for Russia’s Northern Fleet—its most powerful—and the site of numerous air, infantry, missile, and radar bases along with naval shipyards and nuclear reactors. In other words, it’s among the most sensitive military regions in Russia today. Given all this, President Putin has substantially rebuilt that very fleet, which fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union, equipping it with some of the country’s most advanced warships. In 2018, according to The Military Balance, a publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it already possessed the largest number of modern cruisers and destroyers (10) of any Russian fleet, along with 22 attack submarines and numerous support vessels. Also in the Murmansk area are dozens of advanced MiG fighter planes and a wide assortment of anti-aircraft defense systems. Finally, as 2019 ended, Russian military officials indicated for the first time that they had deployed to the Arctic the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, a weapon capable of hypersonic velocities (more than five times the speed of sound), again presumably to a base in the Murmansk region just 125 miles from Norway’s Finnmark, the site of the upcoming NATO exercise. More significant yet is the way Moscow has been strengthening its nuclear forces in the region. Like the United States, Russia maintains a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range “heavy” bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Under the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed by the two countries in 2010, the Russians can deploy no more than 700 delivery systems capable of carrying no more than 1,550 warheads. (That pact will, however, expire in February 2021 unless the two sides agree to an extension, which appears increasingly unlikely in the age of Trump.) According to the Arms Control Association, the Russians are currently believed to be deploying the warheads they are allowed under New START on 66 heavy bombers, 286 ICBMs, and 12 submarines with 160 SLBMs. Eight of those nuclear-armed subs are, in fact, assigned to the Northern Fleet, which means about 110 missiles with as many as 500 warheads—the exact numbers remain shrouded in secrecy—are deployed in the Murmansk area. For Russian nuclear strategists, such nuclear-armed submarines are considered the most “survivable” of the country’s retaliatory systems. In the event of a nuclear exchange with the United States, the country’s heavy bombers and ICBMs could prove relatively vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes as their locations are known and can be targeted by American bombs and missiles with near-pinpoint accuracy. Those subs, however, can leave Murmansk and disappear into the wide Atlantic Ocean at the onset of any crisis and so presumably remain hidden from US spying eyes. To do so, however, requires that they pass through the Barents Sea, avoiding the NATO forces lurking nearby. For Moscow, in other words, the very possibility of deterring a US nuclear strike hinges on its ability to defend its naval stronghold in Murmansk, while maneuvering its submarines past Norway’s Finnmark region. No wonder, then, that this area has assumed enormous strategic importance for Russian military planners—and the upcoming Cold Response 2020 is sure to prove challenging to them. WASHINGTON’S ARCTIC BUILDUP During the Cold War era, Washington viewed the Arctic as a significant strategic arena and constructed a string of military bases across the region. Their main aim: to intercept Soviet bombers and missiles crossing the North Pole on their way to targets in North America. After the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, Washington abandoned many of those bases. Now, however, with the Pentagon once again identifying “great power competition” with Russia and China as the defining characteristic of the present strategic environment, many of those bases are being reoccupied and new ones established. Once again, the Arctic is being viewed as a potential site of conflict with Russia and, as a result, US forces are being readied for possible combat there. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the first official to explain this new strategic outlook at the Arctic Forum in Finland last May. In his address, a kind of “Pompeo Doctrine,” he indicated that the United States was shifting from benign neglect of the region to aggressive involvement and militarization. “We’re entering a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic,” he insisted, “complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to all of our interests in that region.” To better protect those interests against Russia’s military buildup there, “we are fortifying America’s security and diplomatic presence in the area…hosting military exercises, strengthening our force presence, rebuilding our icebreaker fleet, expanding Coast Guard funding, and creating a new senior military post for Arctic Affairs inside of our own military.” The Pentagon has been unwilling to provide many details, but a close reading of the military press suggests that this activity has been particularly focused on northern Norway and adjacent waters. To begin with, the Marine Corps has established a permanent presence in that country, the first time foreign forces have been stationed there since German troops occupied it during World War II. A detachment of about 330 Marines were initially deployed near the port of Trondheim in 2017, presumably to help guard nearby caves that contain hundreds of US tanks and combat vehicles. Two years later, a similarly sized group was then dispatched to the Troms region above the Arctic Circle and far closer to the Russian border. From the Russian perspective, even more threatening is the construction of a US radar station on the Norwegian island of Vardø about 40 miles from the Kola Peninsula. To be operated in conjunction with the Norwegian intelligence service, the focus of the facility will evidently be to snoop on those Russian missile-carrying submarines, assumedly in order to target them and take them out in the earliest stages of any conflict. That Moscow fears just such an outcome is evident from the mock attack it staged on the Vardø facility in 2018, sending 11 Su-24 supersonic bombers on a direct path toward the island. (They turned aside at the last moment.) It has also moved a surface-to-surface missile battery to a spot just 40 miles from Vardø. In addition, in August 2018, the US Navy decided to reactivate the previously decommissioned Second Fleet in the North Atlantic. “A new Second Fleet increases our strategic flexibility to respond—from the Eastern Seaboard to the Barents Sea,” said Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson at the time. As last year ended, that fleet was declared fully operational. DECIPHERING COLD RESPONSE 2020 Exercise Cold Response 2020 must be viewed in the context of all these developments. Few details about the thinking behind the upcoming war games have been made public, but it’s not hard to imagine what at least part of the scenario might be like: a US-Russian clash of some sort leading to Russian attacks aimed at seizing that radar station at Vardø and Norway’s defense headquarters at Bodø on the country’s northwestern coast. The invading troops will be slowed but not stopped by Norwegian forces (and those US Marines stationed in the area), while thousands of reinforcements from NATO bases elsewhere in Europe begin to pour in. Eventually, of course, the tide will turn and the Russians will be forced back. No matter what the official scenario is like, however, for Pentagon planners the situation will go far beyond this. Any Russian assault on critical Norwegian military facilities would presumably be preceded by intense air and missile bombardment and the forward deployment of major naval vessels. This, in turn, would prompt comparable moves by the United States and NATO, probably resulting in violent encounters and the loss of major assets on all sides. In the process, Russia’s key nuclear retaliatory forces would be at risk and quickly placed on high alert with senior officers operating in hair-trigger mode. Any misstep might then lead to what humanity has feared since August 1945: a nuclear apocalypse on Planet Earth. There is no way to know to what degree such considerations are incorporated into the classified versions of the Cold Response 2020 scenario, but it’s unlikely that they’re missing. Indeed, a 2016 version of the exercise involved the participation of three B-52 nuclear bombers from the US Strategic Air Command, [SAC] indicating that the American military is keenly aware of the escalatory risks of any large-scale US-Russian encounter in the Arctic. In short, what might otherwise seem like a routine training exercise in a distant part of the world is actually part of an emerging US strategy to overpower Russia in a critical defensive zone, an approach that could easily result in nuclear war. The Russians are, of course, well aware of this and so will undoubtedly be watching Cold Response 2020 with genuine trepidation. Their fears are understandable—but we should all be concerned about a strategy that seemingly embodies such a high risk of future escalation. Ever since the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons of their own in 1949, strategists have wondered how and where an all-out nuclear war—World War III—would break out. At one time, that incendiary scenario was believed most likely to involve a clash over the divided city of Berlin or along the East-West border in Germany. After the Cold War, however, fears of such a deadly encounter evaporated and few gave much thought to such possibilities. Looking forward today, however, the prospect of a catastrophic World War III is again becoming all too imaginable and this time, it appears, an incident in the Arctic could prove the spark for Armageddon.

### Arctic - Extension

#### NATO escalates tensions in the Artic

Urban, Kathryn. 2022. “NATO’s Nordic Expansion Will Shake up the Arctic.” The National Interest. May 15, 2022. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato%E2%80%99s-nordic-expansion-will-shake-arctic-202428>. /nfs

One outstanding question is the degree to which devastating economic sanctions imposed on Russia will halt its military innovation projects. Nuclear-powered icebreakers currently under construction, for example, [rely](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russias-latest-nuclear-powered-icebreaker-to-boost-indias-arctic-plans-via-northern-sea-route/articleshow/88558084.cms) on India to deliver crucial supply chain components. However, Russia’s existing icebreaker fleet [outstrips](https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907) other Arctic competitors by orders of magnitude, and this trend holds true for most other Arctic military assets as well. Despite the impact of sanctions, NATO states—possibly including Finland and Sweden—will be left playing catch up to the capabilities of an increasingly militant Russia. Foreign policy is fundamentally a game of trade-offs—prioritizing certain threats and opportunities over others. Finland and Sweden’s desire to join NATO is driven by a self-interested [calculation](https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-finland-and-sweden-join-nato) of Russian aggression. The alliance’s enthusiasm to embrace these Nordic members, however, is seen as an opportunity to check Russia’s actions in Ukraine and deliver a message of trans-Atlantic solidarity. This may well be a beneficial move for NATO member states, but it is not without its consequences. Bringing Sweden and Finland into NATO will have knock-on effects beyond Ukraine. Altering the balance of power in the Arctic region will virtually eliminate the possibility of meaningful engagement with Russia on Arctic governance, bringing the region closer to military conflict than at any point since the nuclear buildup in the Cold War. The ripple effects of NATO expansion felt in the Arctic underscore the problem of responsive foreign policy decision-making. NATO’s calculated stand against Russian aggression in Ukraine may serve only to shift the locus of conflict further north.

#### NATO adventurism guarantees conflict – Arctic and Baltics

Scott Ritter, 05-14-2020, (Scott Ritter is a former US Marine Corps intelligence officer. He served in the Soviet Union as an inspector implementing the INF Treaty, in General Schwarzkopf’s staff during the Gulf War, and from 1991-1998 as a UN weapons inspector.), "US muscle-flexing threatens to open Arctic front in new Cold War with Russia," RT International, <https://www.rt.com/op-ed/488679-arctic-military-russia-us/>, Xoxo 7/28/2020

The US Navy is on the cusp of conducting confrontational freedom of navigation operations in the Arctic that threaten Russian economic and national security interests. The recent resumption by the US Navy of a Barents Sea Patrol represents muscle-flexing on the part of Washington and its NATO allies unseen since the end of the Cold War. Three American destroyers and a British frigate, accompanied by a supply ship, ventured into the Arctic body of water last week. The reestablishment of the patrol is part of a larger refocusing of attention by the US and NATO on the Arctic, where warming waters and melting ice have created the possibility of faster sea transits between Europe and Asia and access to natural resources which were previously viewed as cost-prohibitive due to heavy ice conditions. Russia, which views most of the Barents Sea as part of its territorial waters, has made it clear to the US and the international community that it will protect its core national economic and security interests using all means available. Given the stakes involved, the potential for conflict is real should the US seek to expand its military posture more aggressively in the Arctic. This is precisely what some in the US defense establishment are arguing for. In order to prevent what American defense hawks have called a potential maritime “Iron Curtain” from being pulled down over the Arctic by Russia, calls are being made for a more aggressive US naval posture in the region, expanding the Barents Sea Patrol to incorporate so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) as standard practice for US and NATO naval operations in the Arctic north. The US has regularly asserted its right to navigate international waters consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), despite not having signed the agreement (the US sidesteps this inconvenient fact by viewing the provisions of UNCLOS it finds acceptable to operate as common law.) Since 1983, the US Navy has conducted more than 400 FONOPs designed to challenge what it views as excessive maritime claims. The proponents of expanded FONOPs in the Arctic view such exercises as a prerequisite for countering perceived Russian domination of the Arctic region. One of the guiding principles of any US/NATO FONOPs conducted in the Arctic Sea will be to push back on what these nations view as excessively restrictive Russian national legislation based on UNCLOS’ Article 234 governing operations in Arctic waters. As things currently stand, Russia views the Northeast Passage (called the Northern Sea Route in Russia) as being exclusively within Russian territorial waters, and as such traditional freedom of navigation rights do not apply. Instead, Russia has implemented a series of laws which, by placing restrictions on building construction, ship navigation capabilities, and permit requirements, all but precludes freedom of navigation. It should be noted that Russian laws mirror in many respects those of Canada, which – like Russia – uses Article 234 as the basis of its restrictive domestic legislation governing the transit of ships in its territorial Arctic waters. Russian and Canadian interpretation of the rights afforded them under Article 234 are coming under legal challenge by nations such as the US, which want access to the economic potential of the Arctic which are emerging as the ice sheet is pushed back by the effects of global warming. Protecting Russian vested interests in the economic benefits that can be accrued (President Vladimir Putin has assessed the value of the mineral deposits in Russia’s Arctic region as approximately $30 trillion) by exploiting the reduced ice exposure of the Arctic region are a major reason behind Russia’s forward-leaning posture in the region. But there is another critical factor at play, which changes the dynamics of any FONOP-type operation. “Innocent passage” is a critical concept behind any viable FONOP exercise—military vessels must be engaged in non-hostile transit activity. However, US and NATO vessels that would conduct future FONOPs in the Arctic Sea are armed with Aegis surface-to-air missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles that would threaten Russian strategic rocket forces stationed in Siberia. The US is in the process of developing advanced SM-3 Block IIA surface-to-air missiles which can be launched from the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) employed on Aegis-capable ships. These new interceptors are capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and will be tested in this configuration in the third quarter of 2020. Given the fact that the vast majority of Russia’s strategic nuclear force—especially those elements of which are stationed in Siberia—are configured to fly over the Arctic Sea region before reaching their targets in the United States, any US naval deployment in the Arctic Sea armed with these weapons could not be seen as innocent. The Mark 41 VLS is also configured to launch sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). As part of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the US Navy is developing a new nuclear capable SLCM, known as the SLCM-N, which will be armed with a W-80-4 thermonuclear warhead with a variable yield of 5-150 kilotons. Any ship armed with SLCM-N weapons that is operating in the Arctic Sea region will possess an inherent first-strike interdiction capability against Russia’s strategic nuclear forces—again, a capability which makes the transit of such vessels anything but innocent. Russia currently has six military bases in the north, along with 10 airfields, numerous anti-aircraft missile system positions and military ports operating under the umbrella of the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, better known simply as the Arctic forces. The anti-aircraft defenses include the Tor-M2DT, a modernized variant of the Soviet-era SA-15 system, and the newer Pantsir-SA system, both of which have been adapted to operating in the harsh environment of the Arctic north. These systems are designed to defend against cruise missile attacks, and are on 24-hour alert, 365 days per year. Seen in this light, the Russian militarization of the Arctic is more defensive than offensive and intended to protect the vital national security interests of Moscow from threats such as those that would be presented through any aggressive US/NATO FONOPs in the Arctic Sea. Moreover, Russia has a history, dating back to Soviet times, of aggressively defending its national security interests from what it believes to be the encroachment on its territorial waters by FONOPs which violate the requirement of innocent passage. Perhaps the most relevant example of this is found in the ramming incident that transpired off the coast of the Crimean Peninsula on February 12, 1988. The US Navy had dispatched a two-ship task force, consisting of the cruiser USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS Caron, to conduct FONOPs outside of traditional sea lanes. The US claimed it had every right to operate outside these sea lanes, citing innocent passage. The Soviets, however, viewed the presence of two modern warships, more heavily armed than any previous FONOP exercise, as anything but innocent, and dispatched two frigates to challenge the US naval presence. After warning both the Yorktown and Caron to depart, and having these warnings ignored, the Soviet ships proceeded to ram the US navy ships to compel their departure. There can be little doubt that the Russian navy would employ similar tactics—or more—to protect its interests in the Arctic Sea it felt threatened by US/NATO FONOPs that did not meet the criterion of innocent passage. If the US decides to beef up its naval presence in the Arctic region, expanding the current Barents Sea Patrol to incorporate more aggressive FONOPs along Russia’s Northern Sea Route, one can anticipate that Russia will respond in kind, creating the potential for a repeat of the Yorktown/Caron incident in the frigid waters of the Arctic north. In this day and age of renewed Cold War-like tensions between the US/NATO and Russia, the last thing either side needs is a new point of potential force-on-force friction.

#### NATO causes Russian militarization in the Arctic

Urban, Kathryn. 2022. “NATO’s Nordic Expansion Will Shake up the Arctic.” The National Interest. May 15, 2022. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato%E2%80%99s-nordic-expansion-will-shake-arctic-202428>. /nfs

The language of the multilateral boycott of the Arctic Council[leaves open](https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/) the prospect of future re-engagement, “pending consideration of the necessary modalities that can allow us to continue the Council’s important work in view of the current circumstances.” However, there are no indications thus far of a return to normal operations. If Sweden and Finland are admitted to NATO, it is unlikely that Arctic governance will ever again effectively incorporate Russia. The border between Finland and Russia would likely become a militarized zone in the Arctic/sub-Arctic region, as Russian president Vladimir Putin has threatened to [deploy](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10710541/Russia-moves-military-equipment-Finnish-border-warning-Finland-not-join-NATO.html) heavy artillery to the border. It would also leave Russia as the sole Arctic state not part of NATO, eviscerating the balance of interests that has ensured stability in the region in recent decades.

If Russia perceives its fellow Arctic states to be united in an anti-Russian coalition, we should expect the future of Arctic geopolitics to be dominated by militarization. This trend is already being seen. Russia has been steadily expanding its military capabilities in the Arctic since 2014. This has included technological advances, such as[modernizing](https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/iop-2020-u-027998-final.pdf) strategic nuclear submarines in the North Sea or [developing](https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-arctic-military-and-security-part-two/) the ZALA series of weather-resistant drones. Russia’s Arctic build-up has also prioritized human capital, with Moscow permanently [stationing](https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/iop-2020-u-027998-final.pdf) military forces along Russia’s northern coast and running specialized training exercises to improve force operations in the region. In addition to the promised militarization of the Russia-Finland border, the perception of a NATO threat in the region introduces an incentive for escalated Russian security measures.

NATO expansion will also likely change Russia’s narrative on its Arctic posture. Thus far, Moscow has claimed that its military activities in the region are non-threatening. Officials have cited search and rescue operations or shipping lane protection as the rationale underpinning military buildup. In 2021, Nikolai Korchunov, a senior Russian official for the Arctic, emphasized these motivations at an Arctic Council meeting, [saying](https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2021/05/russia-will-not-address-militarization-during-its-chairmanship-arctic-council), “The military activities of Russia in the Arctic do not violate any international obligations, are not aimed at any of the countries in the Arctic region and do not pose any threat to their national security.” But [Sweden](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-swedish-ambiguity-russia-has-passed-200748) and[Finland's](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/finland-close-decision-whether-join-nato-202339) admission to NATO would remove any need for such soothing justifications. Russia has publicly [declared](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/13/world/europe/finland-sweden-nato-russia-ukraine.html) that it would treat Nordic NATO expansion as a provocation and would be prepared to retaliate. Kremlin leadership has long painted NATO’s growth as a threat to European security, including [citing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/12/finland-nato-membership-russia-ukraine/) mid-2000s expansionism as the impetus for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Finland and Sweden’s accession to the alliance would represent a compelling domestic narrative of NATO encroachment in the Arctic as justification for additional Russian defenses in the region.

### Russia-China Alliance Mod

#### US-NATO engagement spurs a Russia-China alliance

Chris Hedges July 12 2022 NATO's endless expansion threatens endless war — and potential nuclear holocaust https://www.salon.com/2022/07/12/natos-endless-expansion-threatens-endless--and-potential-nuclear-holocaust/

The alliance has spurned the Cold War strategy that made sure Washington was closer to Moscow and Beijing than Moscow and Beijing were to each other. U.S. and NATO antagonism have turned Russia and China into close allies. Russia, rich in natural resources, including energy, minerals and grains, and China, a manufacturing and technological behemoth, are a potent combination. NATO no longer distinguishes between the two, announcing in its most recent mission statement that the "deepening strategic partnership" between Russian and China has resulted in "mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order that run counter to our values and interests." On July 6, Christopher Wray, director of the FBI, and Ken McCallum, director general of Britain's MI5, held a joint news conference in London to announce that China was the "biggest long-term threat to our economic and national security." They accused China, like Russia, of interfering in U.S. and U.K. elections. Wray warned the business leaders they addressed that the Chinese government was "set on stealing your technology, whatever it is that makes your industry tick, and using it to undercut your business and dominate your market." This inflammatory rhetoric presages an ominous future.

#### Russia-China alliance will collapse the dollar – causes economic crisis and heg decline

Chris Hedges July 12 2022 NATO's endless expansion threatens endless war — and potential nuclear holocaust https://www.salon.com/2022/07/12/natos-endless-expansion-threatens-endless--and-potential-nuclear-holocaust/

If China, Russia, Iran, India and other nations free themselves from the tyranny of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency and the international Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a messaging network financial institutions use to send and receive information such as money transfer instructions, it will trigger a dramatic decline in the value of the dollar and a financial collapse in the U.S. The huge military expenditures, which have driven the U.S. debt to [$30 trillion](https://www.usdebtclock.org/), $6 trillion more than the entire U.S. GDP, will become untenable. Servicing this debt costs $300 billion a year. We spent more on the military in 2021 — $801 billion, which amounted to 38 percent of total world expenditure on the military — than the next nine countries, including China and Russia, combined. The loss of the dollar as the world's reserve currency will force the U.S. to slash spending, shutter many of its 800 military bases overseas and cope with the inevitable social and political upheavals triggered by economic collapse. It is darkly ironic that NATO has accelerated this possibility.

#### Hegemony is empirically the most stable system and deters all conflict – decline causes transition wars

Robert Kagan, 17, 2-7-2017, Backing Into World War III, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/, Robert Kagan, Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, AVD

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident.

### Russia-China - Extension

#### Russia-China alliance will bring in other players – including Iran and Saudi Arabia

TOM O'CONNOR ON 7/1/22 AT 1:37 PM EDT As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780

Finland and Sweden's green light to join [NATO](https://www.newsweek.com/topic/nato) is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal [membership ascension process](https://www.newsweek.com/afghanistans-fall-china-russias-chance-asia-iran-wants-join-1620873) amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process."

#### Addition of Iran and Saudi Arabia fosters collapse of dollar heg

TOM O'CONNOR ON 7/1/22 AT 1:37 PM EDT As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold https://www.newsweek.com/nato-grows-china-russia-seek-bring-iran-saudi-arabia-fold-1720780

The energy problem plays into two key reasons having both Iran and Saudi Arabia on board for BRICS would be a "major gain" for the organization, according to Akhil Ramesh, a fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum. "For countries like China and to an extent India, import dependency for oil has been a major headache, both from an economic standpoint of trade deficits and from a geopolitical standpoint of having to make security and strategic sacrifices for the sake of oil imports," Ramesh said. "Having three large oil producers in the grouping [Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia] could possibly give these countries the option of securing oil at discounted rates or through alternative arrangements [barter]." Tehran and Riyadh's oil reserves would also lend BRICS a stronger hand in taking on the U.S. dollar's hegemony over the world financial system as Ramesh argued that, "in order to replace the USD as the global reserve currency you would need to have more commodity-exporting countries, especially oil exporting ones buying into the idea."

### Turkey

#### NATO provides Turkey with a political cover to abuse the Kurdish ethnic minority.

Tugal 22 “Turkey shows what NATO really is” May 26th, 2022 Dr. Tugal is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, who writes frequently on Turkey’s politics and society. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/26/opinion/turkey-nato-kurds.html> Accessed July 3rd, 2022 T.T

In April, as the world was occupied with Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, a NATO member [launched an attack](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/18/turkey-launches-new-offensive-against-kurdish-rebels-in-iraq) on two of its neighboring territories. In a bombing campaign, Turkey targeted the camps of Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria, inflicting damage on shelters, ammunition depots and bases. The irony went largely unnoticed. That’s hardly a surprise: For a long time, the Western world has turned a blind eye to Turkey’s heavy-handed treatment of the Kurds. Across decades, the Turkish state has persecuted the Kurdish minority — about 18 percent of the population — with devastating zeal. Thousands have perished and around a [million have been displaced](https://web.archive.org/web/20110131234512/http:/www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpCountrySummaries%29/66D21F80E3A69E41C125732200255E35?OpenDocument&count=10000) in a campaign of severe internal repression. But Western nations, except for a brief spell when Kurdish resistance was holding back an ascendant Islamic State, have rarely seemed to care. Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds is now center stage — but not because allies have woken up to the injustice of Kurds’ systematic oppression. Instead, it’s because Turkey is effectively [threatening to block](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/25/world/russia-ukraine-war/turkey-lists-demands-ahead-of-talks-with-sweden-and-finland-on-their-nato-bids?smid=url-share) the admittance of Finland and Sweden to NATO unless they agree to crack down on Kurdish militants. For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, seeing an opportunity to further cement his nationalist agenda, it’s a bold gambit. The [tepid response](https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-sets-conditions-for-sweden-finland-nato-bids/a-61888896) from NATO allies so far suggests he might be successful. However the situation shakes out, it’s deeply revealing. For Turkey, it underlines once again the vigor with which Mr. Erdogan is keen to stamp out the Kurds while asserting the country as a regional power. For the alliance itself, the impasse brings to light facts currently obscured by its makeover as a purely defensive organization. NATO, which has long acquiesced in the persecution of the Kurds, is far from a force for peace. And Turkey, a member since 1952, proves it.

#### NATO agreed to what amounts to systemic violence against Kurds to sustain membership

Al Jazeera 22 “Why did Turkey lift its veto on Finland and Sweden joining NATO?” June 29th, 2022 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/29/why-did-turkey-lift-its-veto-on-finland-sweden-joining-nato-explainer> Accessed July 3rd, 2022

Turkey has [lifted its veto](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/28/erdogan-to-have-bilateral-talks-with-world-leaders-at-nato-summit) over Finland and Sweden’s bid to join NATO, ending a weeks-long dispute that tested the unity of the alliance against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The breakthrough on Tuesday came after four hours of talks just before a NATO summit began in Madrid, and allows the gathering of 30 leaders in the Spanish capital to show a united front against Moscow, and start the process of Finland and Sweden’s inclusion in the alliance in earnest. The announcement of an agreement cements the biggest shift in European security in decades, as the Nordic countries abandon their decades-long neutrality to enter the military alliance. Here’s a look at why Turkey initially opposed Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid, and why it now backs their membership: Turkey surprised its NATO allies when it initially opposed Finland and Sweden’s bid to join the alliance. Ankara demanded that the Nordic countries **stop supporting Kurdish armed groups**, such as the PKK, and lift their bans on the sales of some arms to Turkey. Turkey raised concerns that Sweden had been harbouring [PKK members](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/20/pkk-central-to-turkish-opposition-to-sweden-finland-joining-nato), which Stockholm denied. NATO operates by consensus, which means that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could have blocked the accession of Finland and Sweden to the 30-nation alliance unless his demands were met, which he had threatened to do. The PKK, a designated “terrorist” group in Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, took up arms against the Turkish state in 1984. Tens of thousands of people have died in Turkey as a result of the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, with the PKK and its offshoots carrying out numerous attacks on military, security forces and civilians, and Turkey conducting operations in southeastern parts of the country with the aim of forcing the PKK out. Turkey considers any support for the Syrian YPG, which it views as an offshoot of the PKK, akin to support for the PKK. The YPG has been backed by many Western nations in the fight against ISIL (ISIS). Turkey has conducted several military operations in both Syria and Iraq over the past few years, targeting the PKK and the YPG. **NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the terms of the deal involved Sweden intensifying work on Turkish extradition requests of suspected fighters and amending Swedish and Finnish law to toughen their approach to them**. Stoltenberg also said that Sweden and Finland would lift their restrictions on selling weapons to Turkey. Ankara hailed the agreement as a triumph. The Turkish president’s office said that Turkey had “got what it wanted” from the deal, and that it meant “full cooperation with Turkey in the fight against the PKK and its affiliates,” including the YPG. Finland and Sweden also agreed “not to impose embargo restrictions in the field of defence industry” on Turkey and to take “concrete steps on the extradition of terrorist criminals”.

#### Turkey is able to exercise control over NATO and other western countries to delegitimize the YPG

Reuters 22 “Sweden's Kurds fear they may pay price for NATO bid as Turkey fumes” June 28th, 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedens-kurds-fear-they-may-pay-price-nato-bid-turkey-fumes-2022-06-28/> Accessed July 3rd, 2022

Turkey has opposed Sweden and Finland's membership of NATO, accusing them of harbouring individuals linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party militant group (PKK) and followers of a cleric Turkey accuses of orchestrating a coup attempt in 2016.

What are these groups?

THE PKK

The Kurds are a minority living in a region straddling the borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and Armenia. In Turkey, they make up about 20% of the population. The PKK was founded in 1978 with the aim of creating an ethnic homeland in southeast Turkey. It took up arms against Turkey in 1984, a conflict in which more than 40,000 people have been killed. Western governments including the United States and European Union designate the PKK as a terrorist organisation. The conflict extends into northern Iraq, where Turkey regularly attacks what it says are PKK camps and ammunition stores. It also spread into Syria as that country descended into war from 2011, and a group inspired by the ideology of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan - the YPG - emerged as an armed faction.

THE YPG The YPG, or People's Protection Units, established a foothold in northern Syria at the Turkish frontier early in Syria's conflict. The group joined a U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State, becoming the spearhead of a wider militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which enjoys U.S. support.

Turkey says the YPG and PKK are one and the same, and views their Syrian foothold as a national security threat. While Turkey brands the YPG as a terrorist group, Western governments do not. U.S. ties to the SDF have annoyed Ankara and been a source of tension for years, with Turkey particularly angered by Washington's supply of weapons to the group. Turkey has launched several incursions into northern Syria. One such incursion, in 2019, prompted Finland and Sweden to ban some arms sales to Turkey. Lifting this is one of Ankara's demands. Turkey says Helsinki and Stockholm failed to agree to Ankara's requests to extradite "dozens of terrorists" over the last five years, including individuals linked to both the PKK and Gulen. Turkey has said it will not look positively on the Nordic states' NATO membership unless they clearly show cooperation on the fight against terrorism and other issues, and lift the arms embargo. Erdogan spoke to both countries' leaders on Saturday, telling Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson that Ankara expected concrete steps to address its concerns, and Finnish President Sauli Niinisto that failing to deal with terrorist organisations posing a threat to a NATO ally would not suit the spirit of alliance. [read more](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/turkey-expects-concrete-swedish-steps-terrorism-erdogan-says-anadolu-2022-05-21/) Many analysts have said Erdogan may be aiming to use this moment to press Washington over some long-standing issues that have weighed on ties, including support for the YPG. [read more](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-turkeys-approach-sweden-finland-nato-bid-not-bilateral-topic-2022-05-20/) WHAT DO FINLAND AND SWEDEN SAY? In her call with Erdogan, Andersson said she emphasised that Sweden welcomed the possibility of cooperation in the fight against international terrorism. Sweden supports the fight against terrorism and agrees with the PKK's terrorist listing. Finland has said it condemns terrorism in all its forms and is open to discussing Turkey's concerns. Niinisto said he held "open and direct" talks with Erdogan and agreed to continue close dialogue

### ILO Mod

#### NATO undermines the international liberal order and the credibility of the UN

Verma 22 Verma, Sudesh. “NATO Has Failed: UN Must Be Strengthened.” The Daily Guardian, 8 Mar. 2022, thedailyguardian.com/nato-has-failed-un-must-be-strengthened/. Accessed 4 July 2022. Sudesh Verma is a senior journalist and president of Debating India Foundation, a Delhi based think tank. //dre

NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create a fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The Russian military intervention in Ukraine has exposed the world’s inability to control the situation if a powerful State decides to use its military power to set things right with its immediate neighbouring countries. The prime reason for this massive failure is the absence of a moral and righteous world body that has the mechanism to implement dharma-based order. NATO clearly does not fit the bill.The only organisation that could do this is the United Nations but it has got weakened due to shadow boxing by major world powers—the Big Five that includes the US, the UK, France, China and Russia. They trust their own military strength and have no reason to strengthen the UN. The veto enjoyed by them ensures that this body remains defunct to prevent any major crisis involving any of these players. All these five have developed sophisticated weaponry and are major suppliers of arms across the world. NATO cannot replace the UN since it is a group of countries having a vested interest to empower itself and maintain superiority vis-a-vis other countries. The world does not matter to NATO countries if they are not involved in acts of war with non-NATO countries. And if push comes to shove NATO can fight any country or grouping in the world based on its combined military strength and economic might. At least NATO would like to believe this.The fact that three permanent members of the UN Security with veto are members of the NATO—France, the UK and the US—makes it evident that the organisation seeks to be happy with its own enclave where they would enjoy liberty, freedom and democracy and will also have the wherewithal to fight others if these are hurt. Even in the vastly interdependent and integrated world, NATO believes that it can live peacefully even if other countries suffer. The UN has 193 members which means that 163 countries are outside the NATO framework. Becoming a member of NATO brings in security plus economic empowerment. Actually, the strategy of the British Empire where the military back-up by the Crown was used to further business interests has been emulated by NATO. NATO would intervene if its economic interest is hurt or if it concludes that certain actions of any country are hurting its core held principles. The massive airpower would ensure that NATO troops would not even need to be on the ground if it desires to punish a country. The control over English media by NATO countries both in terms of finance, governmental control and ideology would ensure that a larger legitimacy is provided to its actions. The US intervention in Afghanistan was justified as much as its withdrawal that happened after two decades. The US intervened in Iraq to destroy weapons of mass destruction but when it did not find any, it blamed intelligence failure. The UN has been relegated to providing legitimacy to the course of action decided by NATO. These NATO countries have enough clout because of their influence and are able to lobby successfully at the UN and get the support of smaller countries to add to their legitimacy. One wonders why was NATO not disbanded with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact—a military alliance of former communist countries with the erstwhile USSR as the fulcrum. Both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO were offshoots of the Cold war and hence when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, NATO should have followed the same course. On the contrary, NATO expanded by inducting former Soviets into it. NATO creates an unequal world and undermines the credibility of the UN. If other countries start emulating the example of NATO and create their own separate military alliances, this would be an end to the existence of the UN. This would also create fertile ground for tension all across the globe. The world would be divided into exclusive economic and military blocs. Ukraine should serve as a lesson to NATO that it cannot do anything in a war-like situation with a powerful country. Some members of NATO are now realising that economic sanctions are going to hurt their own interests more than the interest of Russia. Had NATO not given false confidence to Ukraine and provoked it to seek NATO membership, the present crisis could have been avoided. You can appreciate the security concerns of other countries only when you understand the vulnerabilities. If you are strongly protected by the umbrella of a powerful security alliance you would not feel the pinch. Ukraine was the best as a buffer country between Russia and Western Europe. When Ukraine was forced to abandon its nuclear arsenals all the powers had ensured that it would stay safe and secure and the world would stand guarantee to its neutrality. Sending arms to that country and trying to influence it to become a member of the European Union and then NATO was a violation of that charter. Russian intervention in Ukraine cannot be justified in today’s world and any issue of provocation must be resolved through dialogues. But when unbiased history would be written about this crisis, one would not be able to ignore the fact that Russian overtures to talks were spurned by an overconfident NATO led by the US. Was it not provoked to use its military might to set things right from Russia’s perspective? NATO must ponder over this. The high-sounding words trying to bulldoze Russian President Vladimir Putin have proved to be hollow. NATO cannot get into direct war with Russia since the threat of nuclear weapons poses threat to the entire humanity. The need for a stronger UN was never felt more acutely than it is today. Panic gripped the world when on 4 March, the Russian military fired at the power units of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—the largest nuclear facility in Europe. Energoatom which operates nuclear plants in Ukraine appealed to the world community saying that heavy shelling at the nuclear plants was “a severe violation of nuclear and radiation safety which can lead to hard and tragic consequences for the whole world!” The world had woken up to the warning that it could witness a tragedy worst than that of Chernobyl. Those who may have forgotten must know what Chernobyl disaster a nuclear accident that happened on 26 April 1984 during a routine checking at one of the nuclear plants at Chernobyl. This generated more radioactive radiation than the two bombs that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Chernobyl and areas around it were evacuated and largescale relocation of the population took place in affected areas. The radiation led to people getting various diseases, particularly thyroid cancer. An area of 30 sq km around the plant is now made an exclusion zone where people cannot visit. Close to 150,000 Sq Kms of land area in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine were supposed to have been contaminated. Has the world evolved any mechanism to take care of such eventualities? You can blame one country or the other for the tragedy but who will be responsible for the largescale death and devastation resulting from this no gain blame game. Who is responsible for the death and destruction in Ukraine? The US, NATO or Russia? Or is it the entire world that failed to take corrective action in time? Whether a war or economic sanctions, the result is the same. The common people who have no role suffer the most. If we call ourselves civilised why can’t we evolve a strong mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes? There are few hotspots of the world and immediate attention must be given to them so that rival territorial claims do not become a reason for military conquest. The UN is the only institution that promises hope. A larger role to the UN means that all military alliances or such pacts between countries must be dismantled. The UN must be strengthened to use force too if and when needed—not only for peacekeeping but also for bringing an errant country to sense. One factor that has made the UN almost non-functional in matters of such conflict is the power of the veto. Why should any country have a veto?

#### LIO prevents great power war and key to solve all global problems---creates norms of restraint and cooperation

G. John Ikenberry 2011 – Princeton University Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs "The Future of the Liberal World Order," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:133hPS7EjVUJ:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-05-01/future-liberal-world-order+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

There is no longer any question: **wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South**, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. **The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries**. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: **although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.** Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. **Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system**. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century. THE LIBERAL ASCENDANCY China and the other emerging powers do not face simply an American-led order or a Western system. They face a broader international order that is the product of centuries of struggle and innovation. It is highly developed, expansive, integrated, institutionalized, and deeply rooted in the societies and economies of both advanced capitalist states and developing states. And over the last half century, **this order has been unusually capable of assimilating rising powers** and reconciling political and cultural diversity. Today's international order is the product of two order-building projects that began centuries ago. One is the creation and expansion of the modern state system, a project dating back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the years since then, the project has promulgated rules and principles associated with state sovereignty and norms of great-power conduct. The other project is the construction of the liberal order, which over the last two centuries was led by the United Kingdom and the United States and which in the twentieth century was aided by the rise of liberal democratic states. The two projects have worked together. The Westphalian project has focused on solving the "realist" problems of creating stable and cooperative interstate relations under conditions of anarchy, and the liberal-order-building project has been possible only when relations between the great powers have been stabilized. The "problems of Hobbes," that is, anarchy and power insecurities, have had to be solved in order to take advantage of the "opportunities of Locke," that is, the construction of open and rule-based relations. At the heart of the Westphalian project is the notion of state sovereignty and great-power relations. The original principles of the Westphalian system -- sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention -- reflected an emerging consensus that states were the rightful political units for the establishment of legitimate rule. Founded in western Europe, the Westphalian system has expanded outward to encompass the entire globe. New norms and principles -- such as self-determination and mutual recognition among sovereign states -- have evolved within it, further reinforcing the primacy of states and state authority. Under the banners of sovereignty and self-determination, political movements for decolonization and independence were set in motion in the non-Western developing world, coming to fruition in the decades after World War II. Westphalian norms have been violated and ignored, but they have, nonetheless, been the most salient and agreed-on parts of the international order. A succession of postwar settlements -- Vienna in 1815, Versailles in 1919, Yalta and Potsdam in 1945, and the U.S., Soviet, and European negotiations that ended the Cold War and reunified Germany in the early 1990s -- allowed the great powers to update the principles and practices of their relations. Through war and settlement, the great powers learned how to operate within a multipolar balance-of-power system. Over time, the order has remained a decentralized system in which major states compete and balance against one another. But it has also evolved. **The great powers** have **developed** principles and **practices of restraint and accommodation** that have served their interests. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, where post-Napoleonic France was returned to the great-power club and a congress system was established to manage conflicts, and the UN Security Council today, which has provided a site for great-power consultations, are emblematic of these efforts to create rules and mechanismsthatreinforce restraint and accommodation. The project of constructing a liberal order built on this evolving system of Westphalian relations. In the nineteenth century, liberal internationalism was manifest in the United Kingdom's championing of free trade and the freedom of the seas, but it was limited and coexisted with imperialism and colonialism. In the twentieth century, the United States advanced the liberal order in several phases. After World War I, President Woodrow Wilson and other liberals pushed for an international order organized around a global collective-security body, the League of Nations, in which states would act together to uphold a system of territorial peace. Open trade, national self-determination, and a belief in progressive global change also undergirded the Wilsonian worldview -- a "one world" vision of nation-states that would trade and interact in a multilateral system of laws. But in the interwar period of closed economic systems and imperial blocs, this experiment in liberal order collapsed. After World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt's administration tried to construct a liberal order again, embracing a vision of an open trading system and a global organization in which the great powers would cooperate to keep the peace -- the United Nations. Drawing lessons from Wilson's failure and incorporating ideas from the New Deal, American architects of the postwar order also advanced more ambitious ideas about economic and political cooperation, which were embodied in the Bretton Woods institutions. This vision was originally global in spirit and scope, but it evolved into a more American-led and Western-centered system as a result of the weakness of postwar Europe and rising tensions with the Soviet Union. As the Cold War unfolded, the United States took command of the system, adopting new commitments and functional roles in both security and economics. Its own economic and political system became, in effect, the central component of the larger liberal hegemonic order. Another development of liberal internationalism was quietly launched after World War II, although it took root more slowly and competed with aspects of the Westphalian system. This was the elaboration of the universal rights of man, enshrined in the UN and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A steady stream of conventions and treaties followed that together constitute an extraordinary vision of rights, individuals, sovereignty, and global order. In the decades since the end of the Cold War, notions of "the responsibility to protect" have given the international community legal rights and obligations to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states. Seen in this light, the modern international order is not really American or Western -- even if, for historical reasons, it initially appeared that way. It is something much wider. In the decades after World War II, the United States stepped forward as the hegemonic leader, taking on the privileges and responsibilities of organizing and running the system. It presided over a far-flung international order organized around multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states -- a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics. But now, as this hegemonic organization of the liberal international order starts to change, the hierarchical aspects are fading while the liberal aspects persist. So even as China and other rising states try to contest U.S. leadership -- and there is indeed a struggle over the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the leading states within the system -- the deeper international order remains intact. **Rising powers are finding incentives and opportunities to engage and integrate into this order, doing so to advance their own interests**. For these states, the road to modernity runs through -- not away from -- the existing international order. JOINING THE CLUB **The liberal international order** is not just a collection of liberal democratic states but an international mutual-aid society -- a sort of global political club **that provides members with tools for economic and political advancement. Participants in the order gain trading opportunities, dispute-resolution mechanisms, frameworks for collective action, regulatory agreements, allied security guarantees, and resources** in times of crisis. And just as there are a variety of reasons why rising states will embrace the liberal international order, there are powerful obstacles to opponents who would seek to overturn it. To begin with, rising states have deep interests in an open and rule-based system. Openness gives them access to other societies -- for trade, investment, and knowledge sharing. Without the unrestricted investment from the United States and Europe of the past several decades, for instance, China and the other rising states would be on a much slower developmental path. As these countries grow, they will encounter protectionist and discriminatory reactions from slower-growing countries threatened with the loss of jobs and markets. As a result, the rising states will find the rules and institutions that uphold nondiscrimination and equal access to be critical. The World Trade Organization -- the most formal and developed institution of the liberal international order -- enshrines these rules and norms, and rising states have been eager to join the WTO and gain the rights and protections it affords. China is already deeply enmeshed in the global trading system, with a remarkable 40 percent of its GNP composed of exports -- 25 percent of which go to the United States. China could be drawn further into the liberal order through its desire to have the yuan become an international currency rivaling the U.S. dollar. Aside from conferring prestige, this feat could also stabilize China's exchange rate and grant Chinese leaders autonomy in setting macroeconomic policy. But if China wants to make the yuan a global currency, it will need to loosen its currency controls and strengthen its domestic financial rules and institutions. As Barry Eichengreen and other economic historians have noted, the U.S. dollar assumed its international role after World War II not only because the U.S. economy was large but also because the United States had highly developed financial markets and domestic institutions -- economic and political -- that were stable, open, and grounded in the rule of law. China will feel pressures to establish these same institutional preconditions if it wants the benefits of a global currency. Internationalist-oriented elites in Brazil, China, India, and elsewhere are growing in influence within their societies, creating an expanding global constituency for an open and rule-based international order. These elites were not party to the grand bargains that lay behind the founding of the liberal order in the early postwar decades, and they are seeking to renegotiate their countries' positions within the system. But they are nonetheless embracing the rules and institutions of the old order. They want the protections and rights that come from the international order's Westphalian defense of sovereignty. They care about great-power authority. They want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions -- these are all stages on which rising non-Western states can acquire great-power authority and exercise global leadership. NO OTHER ORDER Meanwhile, there is no competing global organizing logic to liberal internationalism. An alternative, illiberal order -- a "Beijing model" -- would presumably be organized around exclusive blocs, spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks. It would be less open and rule-based, and it would be dominated by an array of state-to-state ties. But on a global scale, such a system would not advance the interests of any of the major states, including China. The Beijing model only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit an open system of markets. But if everyone does, it is no longer an open system but a fragmented, mercantilist, and protectionist complex -- and everyone suffers. It is possible that China could nonetheless move in this direction. This is a future in which China is not a full-blown illiberal hegemon that reorganizes the global rules and institutions. It is simply a spoiler. It attempts to operate both inside and outside the liberal international order. In this case, China would be successful enough with its authoritarian model of development to resist the pressures to liberalize and democratize. But if the rest of the world does not gravitate toward this model, China will find itself subjected to pressure to play by the rules. This dynamic was on display in February 2011, when Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff joined U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in expressing concern over China's currency policy. China can free-ride on the liberal international order, but it will pay the costs of doing so -- and it will still not be able to impose its illiberal vision on the world. In the background, meanwhile, democracy and the rule of law are still the hallmarks of modernity and the global standard for legitimate governance. Although it is true that the spread of democracy has stalled in recent years and that authoritarian China has performed well in the recent economic crisis, there is little evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without moving in a liberal democratic direction. The legitimacy of one-party rule within China rests more on the state's ability to deliver economic growth and full employment than on authoritarian -- let alone communist -- political principles. Kishore Mahbubani, a Singaporean intellectual who has championed China's rise, admits that "China cannot succeed in its goal of becoming a modern developed society until it can take the leap and allow the Chinese people to choose their own rulers." No one knows how far or fast democratic reforms will unfold in China, but a growing middle class, business elites, and human rights groups will exert pressure for them. The Chinese government certainly appears to worry about the long-term preservation of one-party rule, and in the wake of the ongoing revolts against Arab authoritarian regimes, it has tried harder to prevent student gatherings and control foreign journalists. Outside China, democracy has become a near-universal ideal. As the economist Amartya Sen has noted, "While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion democratic governance has achieved the status of being taken to be generally right." All the leading institutions of the global system enshrine democracy as the proper and just form of governance -- and no competing political ideals even lurk on the sidelines. The recent global economic downturn was the first great postwar economic upheaval that emerged from the United States, raising doubts about an American-led world economy and Washington's particular brand of economics. The doctrines of neoliberalism and market fundamentalism have been discredited, particularly among the emerging economies. But liberal internationalism is not the same as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. The liberal internationalism that the United States articulated in the 1940s entailed a more holistic set of ideas about markets, openness, and social stability. It was an attempt to construct an open world economy and reconcile it with social welfare and employment stability. Sustained domestic support for openness, postwar leaders knew, would be possible only if countries also established social protections and regulations that safeguarded economic stability. Indeed, the notions of national security and economic security emerged together in the 1940s, reflecting New Deal and World War II thinking about how liberal democracies would be rendered safe and stable. The Atlantic Charter, announced by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941, and the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 were early efforts to articulate a vision of economic openness and social stability. The United States would do well to try to reach back and rearticulate this view. The world is not rejecting openness and markets; it is asking for a more expansive notion of stability and economic security. REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. **In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up**. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great **powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another** country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism. TIME FOR RENEWAL Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected. In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens. If the architects of the postwar liberal order were alive to see today's system, they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners today than it did during the Cold War. Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling. In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But the solutions to these problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal. The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States (and the West) and the non-Western rising states. Rather, **the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order** built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and **there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West**. The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals. As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status. But this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit. A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance, and with its worldwide system of alliances, the United States will remain at the center of the global system. Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.

### A2 Europe

#### Internal issues gut NATO’s effectivity – further US action furthers Europe’s dependence on faltering American support. Even popular plans can fail amid political chaos

Ashford 22 Ashford, Emma. Dr. Ashford is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who writes extensively on international security and American foreign policy. “Opinion | Europe Has an America Problem.” The New York Times, 28 June 2022, www.nytimes.com/2022/06/28/opinion/nato-europe-united-states.html. Accessed 4 July 2022. //dre

BRUSSELS — President Biden is in Europe, and talk of unity fills the air. At the Group of 7 meeting in Bavaria, Germany, leaders congratulated themselves for their decisions over the past few months and restated their support for Ukraine. They even took time for a “family picture,” the often awkward group shot of world leaders. At the NATO summit in Madrid, which begins on Tuesday, we can expect more of the same. The self-congratulatory atmosphere is quite new. Just three years ago, NATO — frayed by failed interventions in Libya and Iraq, internally divided over its future and buffeted by Donald Trump’s derision — was declared “brain-dead” by President Emmanuel Macron of France. Now the picture is completely different. Four months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO stands as a re-energized bulwark against Russian aggression. European leaders across the continent, determined to come together, speak confidently of common purpose. Yet for all the talk of European resolve, the past few months have in fact underlined something else: the continent’s dependence on the United States to resolve its security problems. That’s nothing new, of course. In many ways it’s the role America has played since the end of World War II, ensuring — even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 — that Europe operated under America’s military umbrella. But while this approach might save leaders from politically difficult choices in the short term, it’s ultimately a losing proposition. America, embroiled in domestic problems and ever more focused on the challenge from China, can’t oversee Europe forever. And Europe, facing a hostile and revisionist Russia, needs to look after itself. These criticisms might sound counterintuitive. After all, Europe has made some major strides on defense in recent months. This is most visible in Germany, where the government has pledged to spend 100 billion euros, or $106 billion, more on defense over the next few years — a change so profound that the German press has adopted Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s description of it as a “Zeitenwende,” or turning point. Other countries, including Italy, Romania and Norway, have also pledged to substantially increase spending. These shifts strike at the common complaint that European states, pusillanimous and miserly, are “free riders” relying on America’s military largess for protection. Yet if European states are reducing their free-rider problem, they have something perhaps more intractable: a collective-action problem. Simply put, the individual interests and inclinations of the European Union’s 27 members, whose countries encompass several thousand miles of territory, make it difficult to forge a common course of action. That’s true for many issues, among them economic reform and the role of the judiciary, but it’s perhaps especially acute for military and defense policy. That applies both to NATO, of which all but six E.U. countries are members, and the European Union’s own Common Security and Defense Policy. Indeed, one core disagreement revolves around whether a buildup in the E.U.’s defense capabilities will actually undermine, rather than strengthen, NATO. To head off such concerns, many favor a division of labor — either by geography or based on specific military capabilities. Yet the precise relationship between the two remains an open question. More profoundly, there are major differences in the perception and prioritization of threats. Central and Eastern European states closest to Russia logically view it as the biggest threat. From farther away, other problems loom larger. Germany and Northern European countries worry about terrorism, France focuses on extremism and unrest in former African colonies like Mali, while Greece and Italy are preoccupied by refugee policy and maritime security in the Mediterranean. One might think that a major geopolitical shock like the war in Ukraine would have allowed for a Europe-wide “Zeitenwende”: a moment to reckon with these difficult questions and hammer out concessions that would allow progress to be made. And in the early weeks of the war in Ukraine, many of these divisions were indeed blotted out by shock and horror, with states largely united in their response to the war. In the months since, however, these divisions have re-emerged, making themselves felt in new ways. Some countries — particularly France, Italy and Germany — are talking about ways to find a peace settlement in Ukraine, even as they continue to send weapons and funds. Yet polling in Poland suggests that it will not countenance peace until Russia is properly punished. The European Union, slowed by the need to reach a consensus, has struggled to keep up. Its much-anticipated Strategic Compass, a strategy paper released after the war started, is a buzzword-filled document that promises a “quantum leap forward” in defense — but does little to address these divisions in practice. In the absence of continental consensus, the glue that continues to hold together European security is the United States. Since February, the trans-Atlantic relationship has slid back into a comfortable groove: The United States provides significant personnel and high-tech weaponry, forestalling the need for other NATO members to commit substantial resources or make tough choices about joint defense. Politically, America’s presence reassures NATO members in Eastern Europe — who have become painfully aware since February that Western European states aren’t as willing to take a hard line on Russia — while allowing Germany to lead Europe without bearing too great a financial and military cost. The underlying disagreements haven’t gone away. But for as long as American troops and hardware are on the continent, European states can have their cake and eat it, too. It’s understandable that European leaders don’t want to engage in punishing political fights at a difficult time. And it is perhaps easy to assume, with 100,000 American troops in Europe, that the U.S. commitment to European security is inviolable. Yet the Trump years should not be so easily forgotten. America’s commitment to Europe’s defense, overseen by Mr. Biden, may seem secure today. But with growing threats in Asia and turmoil in America’s domestic politics, it is most likely a matter of time before that changes. Should he return to the presidency, Mr. Trump may well follow through on his threats to withdraw the United States from NATO. Even some of his less extreme compatriots are questioning America’s role in European defense; in May, 11 Republican senators voted against sending further military aid to Ukraine. There is also a growing consensus in Washington that the United States is urgently needed in the Indo-Pacific to handle the threat from China. Even the best-case scenario — an administration in Washington that remains committed to Europe — carries the risk that a crisis elsewhere could result in a hurried retreat, leaving European states high and dry. American and European leaders may well spend the next days lauding the miraculous recovery of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Yet far from a panacea, America’s support amounts to a Band-Aid covering Europe’s biggest disagreements on defense. To be truly united, European leaders should start the hard work of resolving these differences and rip off the Band-Aid.

#### Tensions already high within NATO with European countries – foster conflict through inequalities

ANDREW DESIDERIO and PAUL MCLEARY 06/27/2022 04:30 AM EDT An alliance, if you can keep it: NATO meets in shadow of Russia-Ukraine war https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/27/nato-russia-ukraine-biden-00042421

Already, tension is building within NATO as powers such as Germany and France deliver amounts of weapons and aid at a pace slower than their economic power suggests they’re capable of. Tiny countries with fresh memories of Russian occupation such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all opened their armories to provide for Ukraine’s defense. Estonia, in particular, has already donated the equivalent of one-third of its annual defense budget this year. Lithuania has risked the Kremlin’s wrath by cutting off railway resupply to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, and Poland has become the jumping-off point for the global effort to arm and supply Ukraine, along with donating more than 200 tanks and other weapons. Warsaw has also focused on getting Ukrainian agricultural products out of the country.

#### NATO has a long history of military failures – especially in Europe

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Introduction The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began as an alliance during the Cold War to oppose the Soviet Union. Despite the fall of the USSR in 1991, NATO’s continuity has led to much debate among scholars as to its purpose and relevance today. An organization that started with only 12 member states, has grown to a become a strong network of 30 members, with more states acting as important global partners. While NATO represents some of the biggest western powers, it is also marked by operational failures and internal disparities. Now the question for this research essay is: has NATO truly been a success? This question is worth exploring from different angles. To find an answer, one must look at the military interventions and activities that NATO has carried out since 1991. This paper will primarily look at NATO’s three most significant interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. While two of these have been successes in the larger picture, the large opportunity costs are often overlooked. And that is what this piece seeks to explore. NATO: Origins and Objectives While countering Soviet expansion is its main goal, NATO member states have also highlighted two other priorities: (1) revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent and (2) encouraging European political integration. Communism was becoming a threat in Europe as governments like that of the Czech Republic were overthrown by rebels. Considering many factors, it was time for a more integrated and like-minded organization of nations to uphold democratic values. The North Atlantic Treaty was enforced in 1949 and mainly laid the foundation for military and political cooperation between its member states. A fundamental aspect of the treaty lies in Article 5, which states that an attack against one member is an attack against all . But NATO has also shown the same level of support for nations expressing their desire to become member states. For instance, the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen strong participation by NATO members as Ukraine aspired to join it. Moreover, the conflict threatened the stability of Europe as a whole, thereby prompting a response from NATO. NATO’s Operations: A List Marked By Failures? NATO has a long list of military interventions in other states with hits and misses. This section will look at four major NATO interventions and their consequences. The Yugoslavian Bombing, (1999) The conflict in the Balkans worsened as Serbia increased its embargos on Kosovan separatists and Albanian civilians. NATO established the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 as a part of UNSC Resolution 1244 which mandated international presence in the region to mitigate the conflict. As the Yugoslavians resisted, NATO carried out a 78-day air bombing, formalizing the KFOR’s entry into the region. The biggest debate here is whether NATO’s actions were humane. Although it achieved its larger goal of stopping Milosevic and separating Kosovo (de facto), the air bombing caused more than 500 civilian deaths. There was an exodus of refugees and the fundamental pillars of the Responsibility to Protect were broken because the people did not receive complete protection. Determining whether NATO’s actions in Kosovo were truly a success or failure depends on what an individual considers more important: the ends or the means. However, in the 21st century, when international organizations are seen as important bodies that represent major interests at a global level, concerns must be solved through dialogue, with force only being used as a last resort. In that sense. NATO’s mistakes in Kosovo seem to overshadow its successes. The War in Afghanistan, (2001-2021) The intervention in Afghanistan is arguably one of NATO’s most important ones. After the 9/11 attacks, the US sent forces to Afghanistan to capture Osama Bin Laden and bring the nation back to democracy after five years of Taliban rule. The US, along with its NATO allies, sent forces to Afghanistan under a UN Security Council mandate. Despite fulfilling both goals of overthrowing the Taliban regime and killing Bin Laden, NATO (primarily US) troops continued to stay in Afghanistan till 2021. Interestingly, the US government published an official document of a Congress hearing on ‘The U.S. Lessons Learned in Afghanistan’, which entailed a list of its intelligence and political failures that led to withdrawal. Despite its fragility, the only reason that the Afghan government was able to sustain itself was because of the support of NATO forces. Things took a turn for the worse when then-president Donald Trump signed an agreement with the Taliban in 2020 to withdraw troops by 2021. While Donald Trump’s actions may be justified from a ‘US national interest’ perspective, the larger interests of the Afghan people were compromised. American and NATO soldiers had indeed been there for twenty years, only to be brought back during the country’s toughest time. The withdrawal of troops led to an immediate fall in the Ghani government which had to concede defeat instantly. Despite twenty long years, one of the most powerful alliances was brought down, leading to its NATO biggest and most shocking security failure. The Intervention of Libya, (2011) While there is much debate on whether the NATO intervention in Libya was a success, it is important not just to look at the conflict itself, but its aftermath as well. Muammar Gadaffi’s Libya was an epicentre of tyranny and human rights violations. As a part of the Responsibility to Protect, the international community had to act. Once again, the result was the victory of NATO forces and the fall of the Gadaffi regime. But the US-led NATO which was supposed to be a ‘beacon’ of democratic values, was not entirely true to its purpose of protecting the civilian population of Libya. While NATO’s main target was the Gadaffi regime, it did not emphasize enough combating rebel groups which were equally dangerous. Libyan rebel groups were responsible for many civilian murders, robberies, and war crimes. The rebels even killed civilians who merely supported the Gadaffi regime but did no crime. As per the first pillar of the R2P, protection applies to the ‘population’ of a nation, which includes every individual residing in the nation. The UN and NATO forces failed to protect a large section of the population. Therefore, while NATO managed to protect those fighting against Gadaffi, it still failed in other areas, leading to another civil war despite an end to Gadaffi’s regime.

#### Europe is VERY anti war right now. And no draw in

Steven Erlanger, June 14, 2019, [Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels.], Distrusting Both Iran and U.S., Europe Urges ‘Maximum Restraint’, New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/world/europe/tanker-europe-strait-of-hormuz.html>, Xoxo 6/7/2020

BRUSSELS — European governments may believe Iran is to blame for the attacks this week on fuel tankers in the Gulf of Oman, but their distrust of the Trump administration and its hawkish policy toward Tehran have led them to measure their words and call for de-escalation and “maximum restraint.” Mindful of Washington’s exaggerations and outright misrepresentations of intelligence leading up to the Iraq war, European leaders are asking the Trump administration for hard evidence. The last thing they want is to be asked to support another American war in the Middle East that would be highly unpopular with voters. Europeans are no fans of the Iranian government or its policies in the Middle East, but they are concerned by what they see as the Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran — thus their use of maximum restraint. Many critics believe Mr. Trump is succeeding only in creating maximum pressure among hard-line factions in Iran to respond with carefully calibrated attacks that send a message, like those against tankers in a vital passageway for global oil supplies. Germany wants a careful investigation of the attacks, insisting that “a spiral of escalation must be avoided.” The European Union, in the words of the spokeswoman Maja Kocijancic, has “said repeatedly that the region doesn’t need further escalation, it doesn’t need further destabilization, it doesn’t need further tension.” Ms. Kocijancic said that European foreign ministers would discuss Iran and other issues at a regular meeting on Monday.

### A2 China

#### NATO securitization against China is a self-fulfilling prophesy – leads to US-China war and extinction

Achcar 22 Achcar, Gilbert. Gilbert Achcar is a professor at SOAS, University of London. His new book, The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China from Kosovo to Ukraine, will come out in early 2023. “NATO from Bad to Worse.” The Nation, 23 June 2022, www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/. Accessed 4 July 2022.

But the most dangerous novelty at the Madrid summit consists of a major qualitative extension of NATO’s purpose. Originally founded as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union and its subordinate states, NATO has mutated after 1991 into a “security organization”—meaning that it has been involved in military actions (NATO as such did not formally engage in any war in the USSR’s days)—and redefined its purpose in ostracizing post-Soviet Russia by expanding toward its borders. The NATO-Russia Council created in 1997 was a meager consolation given to Moscow in lieu of inviting it to join the alliance. Nobody was fooled. From tacit, NATO’s hostility to Russia became explicit after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The forthcoming Madrid summit is going to directly involve NATO in open hostility to China, far beyond the alliance’s original area of relevance. This area is defined in the 1949 treaty constitutive of NATO as comprising “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO’s post-1991 mutation led it to intervene beyond its members’ territory—first in the Balkans, then much further from its original area, in Afghanistan, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Participation in the organization’s meetings has nevertheless remained restricted to Europe and North America. No longer. Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the Madrid summit as NATO “partners” in the Asia-Pacific region—a very serious provocation to Beijing. It can only interpret this invitation as a step toward the consolidation of US-led alliances in a single global network opposed to both Russia and China. After the preliminary meeting of NATO’s defense ministers held on June 16, the organization’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, declared that the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted at the Madrid summit will set out the alliance’s position “on Russia, on emerging challenges, and for the first time, on China.” From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June. From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow. These developments bring the world closer to a conflagration that could dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine and endanger the future of humankind. It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.‌

#### No SCS escalation - nukes, interdependence, and power disparity

Norrlöf 21 – Carla, Visiting Professor at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council and at Massey College, Associate Professor at the University of Toronto, and Research Associate at The Graduate Institute of Geneva. “The Ibn Khaldûn Trap and Great Power Competition with China”, The Washington Quarterly, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1893022>, 03-23-2021

However, the analogy mismatches international hierarchy and regime type. In classical times, the incumbent land power, Sparta, was the authoritarian power who feared the rise of the democratic maritime power, Athens.3 This incongruity is not even the biggest problem with the analogy. **In order for the Thucydides Trap to apply, China would have to significantly narrow the power gap with the United States**. While **China** has caught up with the United States in important respects, it **has not caught up with the United States in terms of the logic and networks that inform dominance in the key economic and security areas required for power transition**.4 **Apart from the obvious inhibiting factors of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence**, **the United States and China are nowhere close to the power parity likely to spark a major power war between them**. The Thucydides Trap is a powerful analogy for bellicose dynamics between a hegemonic power and a rising power, but in the near term, **war between the United States and China** for the reasons proposed in the Thucydidean analogy **is highly unlikely**.

#### No escalation of SCS disputes – all sides show restraints

Bo 20 – Hu, Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy Research and Research Professor at the Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University. He is also Director of the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI). His most recent publications include China’s Sea Power in the Post Mahan Era by China Ocean Press (2018) and Chinese Maritime Power in the 21st Century by Routledge (2019). “China-US Military Confrontation in the South China Sea: Fact and Fiction”, The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-us-military-confrontation-in-the-south-china-sea-fact-and-fiction/+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>, 06-12-2020

**The** **China-U.S. rivalry** **in the South China Sea** **is certainly growing**, **but war is still some way off.** **There are** several **maritime encounters between the two sides every day**, **and** **thousands** **every year**. **Most of them are professional** **and** **safe**; only a few have involved some risks. The recent pandemic has made both countries and militaries more sensitive, which, to some extent, has heightened the tension of the situation.

Because of COVID-19, China and the United States are more concerned and anxious about each other. In addition to maintaining daily operations in the western Pacific, both sides have some new worries. The United States is concerned that China would take advantage of the temporary power vacuum; thus it has deliberately shown more force and given China more diplomatic pressure. **China** **feels** that **Washington’s** South China Sea **policy is** increasingly desperate to the point that, even during the pandemic, the United States has not forgotten **to** **provoke** **China**. Beijing is also convinced that the U.S., motivated by power competition, is focusing on China’s activities and ignoring the actions of other claimants.

**From mid-April to early May**, **the** U.S. **Navy dispatched several warships**, including USS America LHA-6, to the so-called standoff area between the Haiyang Dizhi 8 and the West Capella **to deter** China’s **operations**. **The PLA Navy** was **believed to have a similar number of warships** there at the same time, **which aroused** **heated discussion** **among the media and experts.** Another less publicized but more intense case was the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning formation when it was conducting open sea cross-region mobile training while followed by American warships and multiple military aircraft. An anonymous PLA Navy officer revealed that the confrontation was so intense that one U.S. warship even once came within 100 meters of the Chinese carrier.

**Even so**, **both sides** have **remained** **largely professional** **and** **restrained**. In fact, **neither the Chinese** military **nor the American military has increased** its **activity significantly** **compared** **with the same period of 2019**, **despite the impression** **given by most media reports** **and** **expert commentaries**.

The problem is that these operations are over-exposed and over-focused. **In the backdrop of** **power competition**, **especially amid the pandemic**, in order to show their strength and determination, U.S. **forces have given** **undue prominence** **to covering and publicizing** **military activities**, giving the media and the public a lot to discuss and imagine. There are some hawks in both countries who take advantage of this and exaggerate the situation. Although most countries including the South China Sea claimants, do not want to see China-U.S. military conflict, some individual countries are indeed rejoicing over the growing competition between China and the United States, which may lead to some opportunity for them to expand. China-U.S. military confrontation or even war in the South China Sea has a huge market.

**China and the** **U**nited **S**tates **are**, of course, **preparing for any kind of** military **conflict** and the **worst scenarios** in the South China Sea; **however**, **there is no indication that the two sides want to resolve** their **contradictions** **by using force strategically or operationally** — **despite the** repeated **war rhetoric** from some senior American officials. **In daily military interactions**, **there are really increasing risks**, **but** **in the absence of a subjective desire for conflict**, **these risks are** **highly** likely to be **controlled**.

The most important thing for the Chinese and American militaries to prevent is miscalculation, considering the relatively backward or ineffective crisis management mechanisms of the two countries even compared with Soviet-U.S. and then Russia-U.S. military relations.

In addition, we need to let professionals do their work. The China-U.S. military rivalry has been unduly influenced by the media, commentators, and some politicians, which amplifies the intensity of the competition and is likely to lead to self-fulfilling prophecies.

Both Chinese and the U.S. militaries need to remain competitive and professional, keeping politics and public opinion in check. After all, **if there were to be war**, **it would be the front-line commanders** and sailors **who bear the brunt of it;** **others would be mere bystanders**.

#### Won’t escalate channeled into diplomatic proxy conflicts instead

Tierney 21 – Dominic, a professor of political science, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “The Future of Sino-U.S. Proxy War”, Texas National Security Review, Vol. 4, Issue 2, <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/86247>, xx-xx-2021

Strategic doctrine in both the United States and China has downplayed the possibility of a clash in a foreign internal conflict and in the U.S. case in particular, focused on the potential for a conventional interstate war. However, **the odds that the United States and China will engage in an interstate war are extremely low** due to a number of factors, including nuclear deterrence, regime type, trade relations between the two countries, and international institutions. **Military competition is much more likely to take the form of a proxy war in which Washington and Beijing aid different actors in an intrastate conflict because of a systemwide shift away from interstate war** and toward civil war, continued American hyper-interventionism, and growing Chinese interventionism. In the coming years, internal conflicts in countries like Venezuela, Pakistan, Myanmar, or North Korea could become battlegrounds for great-power rivalry. **Such U.S.-Chinese proxy wars will likely be much subtler than the heavy-handed proxy conflicts of the Cold War** **and involve diplomatic initiatives, economic aid, cyber war, propaganda, and competition within international institutions**. Indeed, Washington and Beijing may compartmentalize a particular proxy campaign — sparring in one civil war while steering clear of each other or even cooperating in another internal conflict. U.S. analysts often characterize the global system in terms of a shift from the counter-terrorism paradigm of the post-9/11 era, which was focused on insecure states and nonstate actors, to the great-power competition paradigm of today’s era, which prioritizes U.S. relations with China and Russia. However, these two paradigms are less distinct than sometimes thought: Future great-power competition, like earlier counter-terrorism efforts, may occur within insecure states and feature alliances with nonstate actors. **The question remains whether a Sino-U.S. proxy war could spiral into an interstate war**. **The barriers to direct hostilities make this outcome unlikely**, but proxy conflicts could still escalate in unexpected and costly ways. The United States and China may try to manipulate civil wars in far-flung lands they do not understand. Washington has a history of wading into strife-torn countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq, with alien cultures and languages, leading to strategic failure. Beijing is even less prepared to comprehend or shape the contours of foreign civil wars due to a lack of capabilities and experience. Because of the psychological dynamic of loss aversion, these two great powers may be willing to ratchet up their commitment in a given proxy war to avoid the defeat of a favored actor. In addition, local surrogates could act independently in ways that might escalate a conflict.